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David Robinson 
The Philosophy of Perception: 
A Wittgensteinian Perspective 
The aim of this thesis is to balance a positive account of the family of 
concepts included i n and logically involved with the concept of 
perception, with c r i t i c a l considerations of accounts that are 
philosophically problematic. 
The problematic accounts i n question w i l l range from those of 
Wittgenstein's contemporaries, or near contemporaries, such as Russell, 
James and Kohler, to those of psychologists and philosophers of our own 
time, some, but not a l l , of whom profess to embrace Wittgenstein's 
position; these w i l l include the authors of a standard textbook on 
visual perception (Bruce and Green), Quine, Peacocke, Vesey, Anscombe, 
Martin, McDowell, Mulhall and Candlish. Additionally, the general nature 
of the problems i n question w i l l be reflected i n a positive account of 
the concepts of acceleration (chapter 1), identity and personal identity 
(chapter 5), i n relation to problematic accounts given by Leibniz and 
Parfit respectively. 
Crucial to this aim w i l l be an interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
position that i s distinct from a l l those positions that profess to be 
Wittgensteinian, but that i n fact remain i n the grip of the very 
Cartesian / empiricist preconceptions that Wittgenstein diagnoses as the 
source of the problems. This w i l l be the key to the positve account, and 
w i l l depend on showing that Wittgenstein's diagnosis i s essentially the 
same for a l l problems of a philosophical nature, despite i t s highly 
specific application to problems concerning various concepts in 
different parts of the Investigations, whose subtle differences i t i s 
equally important to discern clearly. 
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What I hope to show i n this thesis is that Wittgenstein's approach to 
philosophical problems i n general and to the problems traditionally 
associated with the concept of perception in particular, manifests an 
entirely distinctive position, from the viewpoint of which the problems 
are genuinely dissolved. 
Unless the distinctiveness of this position i s appreciated, 
however, the sense f e l t by some that Wittgenstein's approach i s merely a 
philosophically respectable way of avoiding the problems, and that his 
methodology i s more s t y l i s t i c than substantial, becomes inevitable. My 
aim, therefore, i s two-fold. The positive account I shall give of what I 
see as the substantially Wittgensteinian position, and of i t s relevance 
to the problems of perception, w i l l be balanced against analyses of a 
number of ways in which I believe i t s distinctiveness has not been 
appreciated by various philosophers. 
Interpretations of Wittgenstein are often coloured by the 
preconceptions from which a commentator approaches him. What can seem 
d i f f i c u l t about his writings is that his highly compressed comments w i l l 
sometimes appear almost to f i t a certain preconception, but not quite. 
The tendency then i s to dismiss the "loose ends" as s t y l i s t i c quirks, or 
ineffective attempts to resist being grouped among other philosophers 
with basically the same outlook. 
Some of these commentators perhaps hope they can use Wittgenstein 
to lend weight to their own positions, which Wittgenstein putatively 
"approximates" to and, with appropriate modifications can be made to 
serve a more "exact" account ( I am thinking of Peacocke i n particular 
here). Alternatively, a philosopher who places himself i n one "camp" may 
interpret Wittgenstein as f a l l i n g into an opposing one. J.J.C.Smart, for 
example, construes Wittgenstein as a behaviourist, which indeed seems 
the only interpretation available from within the preconceptions of 
materialism. The d i f f i c u l t y for such philosophers really l i e s i n 
escaping the confines of their own preconceptions. Without being able to 
do so, the distinctiveness of Wittgenstein's position w i l l not be 
grasped and w i l l be consistently misunderstood. 
Overcoming the preconceptions of empiricism, which has shaped 
thinking i n the English-speaking world for more than three centuries, 
remains a d i f f i c u l t y for those who resist physicalism i n the philosophy 
of mind. We are thus easily persuaded that Wittgenstein's observations 
are c l a r i f i e d by being translated into the terms of such preconceptions. 
Here I am thinking of Vesey, •who, li k e Peacocke, interprets Wittgenstein 
i n such a way that the apparent solution to the problem he i s trying to 
solve contains the very misconceptions that Wittgenstein himself 
identifies as the source of that problem. In chapter 2 I hope to show 
that the perceptual concepts treated i n I I , x i of the Investigations are 
coherently accommodated only on a distinctively Wittgensteinian 
categorical axis, that indirect realism, Humean idealism and the radical 
empiricism of James and the Gestaltists a l l f a i l to recognize. 
One of the crucial features of Wittgenstein's methodology is the 
balancing of a very general distinction or axis that applies to a l l 
problems of a philosophical nature, with the extremely subtle 
discernment of differences among concepts to which i t s application takes 
a very precise form. The general axis, which can be traced back to the 
Tractatus as the distinction between the nature of science and of 
philosophy (which there was taken to mark the limits of language), i s 
manifested i n i t s application to clusters of related but subtly 
different concepts; the generality of i t s relevance within each cluster 
i s gradually revealed i n a sequence of examples representing a different 
concept of the "family", each of which helps to indicate the point being 
made by eliminating the inessentials of the others by means of i t s 
differences. 
The general nature of the science/philosophy distinction w i l l form 
the subject of chapter 1, where, to emphasise i t s generality, I shall 
i l l u s t r a t e i t s application to the concept of acceleration; a l l concepts, 
including those of perception, rest on the concepts of space, time and 
motion, so the examination of the structure of this family of concepts 
entailed by considerations of the concept of acceleration, may help to 
reveal something of the structure of perceptual concepts. 
Both Mulhall and Candlish, I think, place too much emphasis on 
just one of the concepts of the clusters presented i n Investigations I I , 
x i and v i i i respectively, resulting in an unwarranted generalization 
that loses sight both of the general point that Wittgenstein is drawing 
out of the whole cluster, and of the fact that each concept of the 
cluster i s a different concept. Each cluster reveals a distinctive 
aspect of the categorical axis, the "point" of which is to present the 
antidote to a certain misunderstanding of such concepts. The 
misunderstanding treated i n x i i s actually perpetuated by Mulhall's 
i i 
application of "continuous aspect perception" to perception in general, 
for that concept i s revealed by "noticing an aspect", which i n turn 
manifests the categorical distinction between two senses of seeing. 
Mulhall's generalization merely fuses the two senses, thus obliterating 
the very axis that is the key to the solution of philosophical problems 
i n general, and i n this case to those associated with empiricist 
misconceptions of perceptual concepts i n particular. These criticisms 
w i l l form part I I I of chapter 2. 
The reasons for my criticisms of Candlish1s account of v i i i are 
similar but inverted. Since the "point" i n v i i i i s e x p l i c i t l y applied 
not just to Kinaesthesia but to concepts of hearing, seeing and 
sensation also, the putative "radical difference" between Kinaesthetic 
awareness and visual or auditory perception cannot be Wittgenstein's 
point here. The concepts of this cluster are a l l different, of course, 
but Wittgenstein's purpose i n juxtaposing them i s to reveal the 
categorical axis that runs through these as well as the cluster of x i , 
but i n a l i g h t peculiar to the cluster of v i i i . The misunderstanding to 
be cured i n this case i s that which gives rise to the pseudo-concept of 
"sense-data" and their putative role in the "flow of information", which 
once again trades on the obliteration of the crucial axis. In part I I of 
chapter 3, critcism of Candlish's, Martin's and Anscombe's accounts of 
kinaesthesia w i l l be complimentary to a positive account. 
In chapter 4 my main target w i l l be Quine's account of the 
acquisition of beliefs and of concept-formation, and Armstrong's 
construal of perception i n terms of belief-states w i l l be discarded 
along the way. Then I shall bring criticisms of Anscombe's account of 
proprioception outlined i n chapter 3 into line with criticisms of 
McDowell's disjunctive account of perception ( the reasons for my 
objections are similar i n the two cases). 
In the f i n a l chapter I shall develop a positive account of 
recognition and identity stemming from my objections in chapter 4 to 
Quine's construal of the discernment of identity i n terms of systems of 
hypotheses. I shall offer an alternative to Leibniz's indiscernibility 
criterion and then take a c r i t i c a l view of Parfit's "psychological 
survival" substitution for personal identity. 
i i i 
1 Ttegal anreafcjltmTi as l^ Ife^srApfcMHlo 
A recurrent theme i n parts I and I I of the Philosophical Investigations, 
and indeed i n the Tractatus, is the distinctive nature of philosophy as 
opposed to science, and the methodology appropriate to philosophical and 
scientific problems respectively. This theme i s particularly pertinent 
to the philosophy of perception, since the philosophical problems 
concerning perception traditionally arise from scientific 
considerations. 
A Wittgensteinian solution to the traditional "paradoxes" of 
perception w i l l therefore hinge on the important distinction between the 
methodology of science, and that of philosophy, which corresponds to a 
distinction between problems of two different kinds. In the f i n a l 
section of the Investigations, Wittgenstein concludes that psychology 
has failed to solve such paradoxes, not because i t i s a "young science", 
but because i t s methodology i s inappropriate to the nature of the 
problems i t addresses, so that "problem and method pass one another by." 
Hence, psychology i s merely "barren and confused".! 
In part one of the Investigations, Wittgenstein prepares us for 
this conclusion by drawing our attention to the relevant distinction at 
several points. At 109 i t i s observed that "our considerations could not 
be sci e n t i f i c ones" (since they concern logic and language); "We may not 
advance any kind of theory" (as perhaps Wittgenstein himself did i n the 
Tractatus); "There must not be anything hypothetical i n our 
considerations" (such as the "formal unity" of "what we c a l l 'sentence' 
and 'language'", or the "preconceived idea of crystalline purity"); "We 
must do away with a l l explanation, and description alone must take i t s 
place. And this description gets i t s l i g h t , that i s to say i t s purpose, 
from the philosophical problems." 
What determines the way we describe things is our consideration of 
which words are appropriate. This concerns the meanings of the words 
used, which i s to say the rules for their use. In 108 the ideal "formal 
unity" of these rules presumed i n the Tractatus i s replaced by the 
analogy for language that is most central to and characteristic of part 
I of the Investigations - the concept of games as spatio-temporal 
phenomena: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of 
language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm." But 
crucially the concept "language" is analogous to the concept "game", not 
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to any specific game which has fixed rules. Many "games" might be played 
within language. Language as a whole i s not analogous to a game, such as 
chess, but a^  language-game might be analogous to, say, chess. In the 
Tractatus, the rules of what we might c a l l "language as a whole" were 
thought of as being l i k e the rules of a specific game, instead of games 
generally. 
However, the point that concerns us here i s one that runs through 
both the Tractatus and the Investigations, because i t legitimately 
applies to language-games i n general, and can be illust r a t e d by an 
analogous example in the form of any specific game. This analogy is made 
at the end of 108, and the point is developed in 109: "But we talk about 
[language] as we do [for example] about the pieces i n chess when we are 
stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical 
properties." (Compare this with Tractatus 4.111 - "Philosophy i s not one 
of the natural sciences.") Since we are concerned with the various ways 
the rules of language operate, our philosophical descriptions operate on 
a metalinguistic level. That i s why we must be content with "description 
alone"; any possible theory w i l l make the rules out to be fixed and 
unified as i n a particular game, and hence alter them. Scientific 
description, on the other hand, operates i n the object-language. We can 
offer theories on this level, since such theorizing constitutes just one 
language-game that alters neither the world i t s e l f nor the rules of 
other language-games. 
The point appears once more at 654: "Our mistake i s to look for an 
explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-
phenomenon'. That i s , where we ought to have said: this language-game is 
played." And 655 - "The question is not one of explaining a language-
game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game." -
echoes a proposition near the end of 109: "The problems are solved, not 
by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known." 
The e x p l i c i t application of this idea to a specifically perceptual 
concept and i t s attendant philosophical "problems" occurs i n section x i 
of part I I (p.212). The experience of seeing something differently that 
remains the same may invite various attempts at explanation when certain 
preconceptions about the concept of seeing make the actual experience 
seem paradoxical. But should we really be looking for an explanation, or 
examining the concept and our preconception of i t ? Perhaps I do not "see 
something different each time", but only "interpret what I see in a 
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different way". But this "explanation" does not do justice to the nature 
of the experience: "To interpret i s to think/ to do something; seeing i s 
a state." 
> Alternatively: "Imagine a physiological explanation of the 
experience. Let i t be this: [when we notice an alternative "aspect" our 
eyes jump from one pattern of oscillation to another] - Yes, that shews 
i t i s a kind of seeing.- You have now introduced a new, a physiological 
criterion for seeing. And this can screen the old problem from view, but 
not solve it...The psychological concept hangs out of reach of this 
explanation. And th i s makes the nature of the problem clearer." 
The problem i s not a scientific one, then, but one concerning the 
concept of seeing - how the word "see" i s used, which i s something we 
already know i f we understand i t s meaning; so that i t i s only a matter 
of reminding ourselves. I f we do not already know, we shall gain no 
relevant understanding by examining the physical processes of vision. 
The same lesson i m p l i c i t l y underlies an example concerning our 
hearing i n section v i i i : " I may be able to t e l l the direction from which 
a sound comes only because i t affects one ear more strongly than 
another" - that i s a l i k e l y explanation, but i t introduces a new, 
physical cr i t e r i o n for hearing the direction from which a sound 
comes. The usual criterion must be part of my experience, but this 
physical cause i s not so - " I don't feel this i n my ears". The "new 
criterion" w i l l solve any possible "problems" with this concept only by 
overriding the usual criterion and thus denying the true nature of the 
experience. (Section v i i i w i l l be a main topic i n chapter 3.) 
Despite the very specific nature of the examples to which i t has a 
useful application, this distinction is perhaps Wittgenstein's most 
generally applicable, since i t concerns the nature of philosophy 
i t s e l f . For that reason i t i s easily overlooked, as i f we were always 
too close to i t to see i t . So i t i s a l l the more helpful to be reminded 
of i t i n approaching any problem of a philosophical nature, thought i t s 
generality should not be allowed to disguise the precise and often 
d i f f i c u l t way that i t actually weaves into the treatment of a given 
problem. In the case of the family of subtly different perceptual 
concepts, the distinction l i e s within the concepts themselves, which 
span i t . Perceptual concepts are perhaps most central i n problems of a 
philosophical nature, since the slightest adjustment i n their 
characterization has implications i n metaphysics, epistemology and the 
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philosophy of mindo The subtlest misdescription can throw us into 
seemingly inescapable absurdities, collapse us into spaceless, timeless 
nothingness; and i t s rectification can just as easily bring us back into 
a familiar and i n t e l l i g i b l e world where we are allowed to go on 
understanding things as i t comes most naturally to us to do so. That 
this main distinction i s the single most useful tool i n the description 
of perceptual concepts i s shown by i t s crucial presence i n I I , x i of the 
Investigations, where i t s categorical nature is illuminated. This w i l l 
be the main theme of chapter 2„ 
In the Investigations, though the distinction i s introduced i n i t s 
most general form as an observation about language and logic, i t s main 
purpose becomes the treatment of psychological concepts, including 
perceptual ones. Wittgenstein's aim i s to clear away the false 
foundations on which the psychologizing tendencies of empiricism i n 
philosophy and the natural sciences, as well as the "scientizing" of 
psychology, had grown since the time of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, to 
that of James, Russell, Mach, Freud and the Gestaltists. These "false 
foundations" are formed l i k e knots i n our understanding by various 
maladjustments i n the characterization of the concepts i n question, that 
gather inevitably i n clusters around the central oversight of this mai 
distinction. The "knots" unravelled i n the Investigations are perhaps 
most central to philosophy and of the most general human concern, but 
"knots" i n the concepts of time, space and motion also result from the 
same source; the paradoxical consequences of Cartesian and Leibnizian 
(and indeed Newtonian and Kantian) accounts of these concepts result 
from the same categorical oversight, perhaps as an inheritance from 
Zeno. In order not to lose sight of the extreme universality of the 
distinction, and hence to be able to recognize the same principle at 
work i n the various highly specific contexts where the 
subtle discernment of different perceptual concepts i s equally 
important, i t may be helpful to i l l u s t r a t e the unravelling of one of the 
characteristically Leibnizian "knots" i n a particular concept of space, 
time and motion - that of acceleration. I shall approach this with a 
reminder of the nature of the distinction between sci e n t i f i c and 
philosophical methodology. 
Given a specific scientific theory, an observed anomaly w i l l 
demand an explanation within the terms of that theory. To c i t e a well-
known example, the orbit of the planet Uranus was not explained by the 
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presence of Neptune alone. Given Newtonian mechanics/ only the presence 
of an undiscovered ninth planet would explain the anomaly. The theory 
therefore predicted the presence of a ninth planet, and the subsequent 
discovery of Pluto confirmed the predictive power of Newtonian 
mechanics; but, ironically, the nature of Pluto i s such that s t i l l i t 
did not account for the precise orbit of Uranus. 
The relative success of Newtonian mechanics may seem sufficient to 
motivate the continued search for explanations of the anomaly within the 
terms of the theory (e.g. the possibility of a tenth planet); but a more 
c r i t i c a l approach would be to suspect the theory i t s e l f . Indeed, even 
the Theory of Relativity, though providing more accurately confirmed 
predictions than Newtonian mechanics, did not give the accuracy 
astronomers expected. 
Theories, unlike the phenomena they attempt to explain, are 
linguistic items. A fact, such as the presence of a planet, serves as an 
explanation only as the referent of a declarative sentence that i s a 
logical consequence of a theory. Theories presuppose and work with a 
language whose terms are commonly understood. To allow for the 
possibility that a given theory or hypothesis may be false, this 
presupposed language upon which a l l theories depend, must at some level 
remain immune to the fortunes of theory. I f ordinary language can 
appropriately be called a "foundation" i n this context, then i t i s this 
special li n g u i s t i c brand of foundationalism which characterises 
Wittgenstein's position; the foundation which remains after any 
scientific hypothesis has risen or fallen, and to which we must return 
in order to replace one theory with another, i s "what happens [ i n 
language] as a 'proto-phenomenon'"2, and to reveal t h i s , we must "do 
away with a l l explanation and description alone must take i t s place."3 
But of course a "foundation" i s such only i f i t does serve the function 
of a foundation, and since th i s "proto-phenomenon" need not support any 
theoretical superstructure at a l l , Wittgenstein's position may be 
regarded as a kind of foundationalism only i n relation to scientific 
purposes. 
The relation between explanation and description here is a 
supervenient one - explanations are descriptions, but not a l l 
descriptions are explanations. Equally, some descriptions are false or 
incoherent; but the possibility of a false or incoherent description i s 
dependent on the possibility of a true and coherent one. Scientific 
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(explanatory) description operates i n the object-language and seeks new 
facts to provide as many theoretical consequences with the confirmation 
they require to serve an explanatory function as possible„ The discovery 
of, new facts, however, also introduces new observation statements„ 
Certain facts may prompt descriptions which nest i n our ordinary 
language i n a paradoxical manner. The uncritical approach to such 
problems i s to accept the description as i t stands as a contribution to 
the class of true observation statements which, given a commensurate 
explanation, w i l l support the theory i n quest ion <> The c r i t i c a l approach, 
on the other hand, i s to examine the description i t s e l f , and so operates 
i n the metalanguage„ Problems solved i n this way are philosophical 
problems i n Wittgenstein's sense; Wittgensteinian solutions, or 
dissolutions, are elucidations of "what we have always known"» "What we 
have always known" underpins further knowledge, but unlike Kantian a 
p r i o r i knowledge, s t i l l had to be learned. 
I shall now t r y to i l l u s t r a t e the application of Wittgensteinian 
methodology to the unravelling of the characteristic Leibnizian "knot" 
i n the concept of acceleration that results from a traditional way of 
describing the measurement of space and time, which seems to j u s t i f y 
the introduction of the paradoxical pseudo-concept of infinitesimals. 
I f i t i s accepted that the correct terms for the representation of 
a particular instance of acceleration i s , say, that a car i s travelling 
at precisely 60 m.p.h. after precisely 15 seconds - i.e., that the car 
must be doing an exact speed at an exact time, then the concept of 
acceleration i s rendered inherently paradoxical, since i t i s impossible 
to arrive at a metaphysically precise value for the rati o of speed 
against time (as opposed to the ratio of distance against time for 
constant speed). Given such a description, the concept of infinitesimals 
seems indispensable, since this allows so close an approach to the 
impossible that the remainder i s , supposedly, not even quantifiable; yet 
because this unquantifiable remainder w i l l not allow the impossible ever 
to be reached, i t seems to save such a representation of acceleration 
from collapsing into absurdity. But this i s to fight f i r e with f i r e , for 
instead of one philosophical problem we now have two, thanks to the 
paradoxical nature of infinitesimals themselves. While we accept this 
account as an accurate and coherent description of the phenomenon, we 
can only hope to find a solution to the paradoxes, i f at a l l , by seeking 
some new fact to act as the referent of an explanatory observation 
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statemento But by examining the description i t s e l f , we may uncover i t s 
inherent confusions and perhaps replace i t with a coherent one, i n which 
case there w i l l be no requirement for explanation„ 
, The fundamental flaw i n the Leibnizian account i s the acceptance 
of an implicit interpretation of acceleration values which incoherently 
represents something travelling at a certain spaed, increasing or 
constant, at a certain "point i n time", rather than during a certain 
period of time. This amounts to the requirement that something be 
travelling at a certain speed i n no time. The source of the confusion 
l i e s i n the fact that constant speed i s correctly represented by a 
direct ra t i o between a period of time and an interval of space, each 
with metaphysically precise l i m i t s . Because one end of the temporal 
interval coincides precisely with one end of the spatial one, the 
ill u s i o n i s created that i t i s the l i m i t s which represent the speed 
value rather than the periods. This confusion between l i m i t s and the 
periods they define inevitably creates problems i n the representation of 
acceleration, where a scale of increasing speed, which already contains 
time, i s plotted against time. Hence, what appears as a l i m i t on the 
speed scale really represents a ratio between periods, which i n turn i s 
plotted against a l i m i t on the temporal scale. The problem i s solved 
once i t i s recognized that the l i m i t on the temporal scale represents a 
period of time defined by lim i t s corresponding to the l i m i t s of a range 
of increasing speed on the speed scale, such that the resulting 
acceleration value i s always a ratio between an a r b i t r a r i l y defined, or 
undefined, period of time, and an average speed. The breadth between the 
lim i t s we set on this average varies according to circumstance, context, 
and above a l l , purpose. 
This categorical difference between spatio-temporal regions and 
the limits which define them corresponds roughly to the Kantian 
distinction between the content and the form of "empirical r e a l i t y " ; as 
important as the distinction i t s e l f i s the mutual dependency between the 
two aspects - form cannot be separated from content, or vice-versa, any 
more than the colour of an apple can be "peeled" off the apple, or an 
apple can be without any colour. The failure to understand this 
dependency i s an integral part of the failure to recognize that the 
distinction i s a categorical one rather than one between "objects" or 
"substances". 
The importance of these issues to Wittgenstein's aims in the 
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Investigations emerges clearly at para.108, i n relation to the 
difference between the methods of science and of philosophy, which i s 
shown to be a categorical one by means of an analogy between syntax and 
the rules of chess= While science investigates the physical properties 
of objects, we would not discover what makes a particular lump of wood a 
chess-piece by any such investigation,, And what we must investigate i n 
order to discover this i s not some other "object", but the system of 
rules i n which such an object operates„ The rules of chess, which 
determine the way the various pieces relate to each other, are analogous 
to the rules of syntax which determine the way words relate to each 
othero But while i t i s syntax which carries the deductive forms of our 
reasoning, th i s i s "empty" without the semantic dimension (whose rules 
relate sentences to facts), which i s pr o b a b i l i s t i c 
The rules of syntax i n most languages are more or less "fixed"» In 
the Investigations this i s imp l i c i t l y accepted i n the chess analogy, by 
means of which Wittgenstein draws the same categorical distinction 
between the methods of science and those of philosophy that he did i n 
the Tractatus., I t i s i n the semantic dimension that the essentialism of 
the earlier work i s abandoned» In the Tractatus, the l i m i t s of language 
- of "what can be said" 4 are fixed i n both syntactic and semantic 
dimensionso This renders the propositions of the Tractatus, s t r i c t l y 
speaking, meaningless, since ex hypothesi i t i s impossible to use 
language to talk about language - the l i m i t s of language coincide with 
the subject matter of science (though what i s important for W o , as 
opposed to the positivists, i s precisely what "we must pass over i n 
silence") <> The Tractatus presents a paradox concerning language which i s 
similar to the paradox concerning acceleration that the Infinitesimal 
Calculus presents* In the desire for metaphysical precision, the l i m i t s 
of language are drawn as an absolute boundary, whereas i n fact the 
finitude of language i s marked by an indefinite range of boundaries, 
which are chosen according to the purpose which motivates a particular 
use of that language, much i n the way that the lim i t s of a given 
acceleration value are set i n particular circumstances according to 
context and purpose, but cannot be fixed i n an absolute sense. Just as a 
representation of acceleration must take account of the continuing 
acceleration of an accelerating body through time, so a representation 
of language must take account of i t s continued application through time. 
Science sets a certain l i m i t on language, but philosophy cannot set i t s 
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l i m i t i n the same place; for the subject matter of philosophy -
language, 
which i s the equipment of theoretical science - creates i t s own time and 
spaceo I t cannot be reduced to a metaphysical, dimensionless point. I t 
i s not a l i m i t on the world, but a region of i t : "We are talking about 
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-
spatial, non-temporal phantasm.1,5 
Paradoxes are not independent of certain kinds of description; 
they occur when "language goes on holiday" 6, from whence our steps have 
to be retraced to the "proto-phenomenon"7 of ordinary language, and this 
means a return to the de facto i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of familiar concepts. But 
for this to be possible, our "proto-phenomenon" must inhabit time and 
space - we must be able to go there, i f only to "arrive where we 
started/And know the place for the f i r s t time."8 
The de Facto I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the Concept "Perception". 
Like the concept "belief", Wittgenstein does not treat the concept 
"perception" e x p l i c i t l y u n t i l part I I of the Investigations. In both 
cases, the concepts are treated i n the context of special philosophical 
problems; belief i s considered with respect to Moore's Paradox9, and 
perception to the "paradoxical" pictures which were of particular 
importance i n Gestalt Psychology. The la t t e r presented for Wittgenstein 
an opportunity to apply his own principle of reminding ourselves of what 
we already know but might have overlooked. The categorical distinction 
between the subject matter of science and that of philosophy, originally 
misidentified i n the Tractatus as the metaphysical l i m i t of what can be 
said, then identified i n part I of the Investigations as a spatio-
temporal region occupied, or rather autonomously created, by human 
act i v i t y ("forms of l i f e " ) , i s manifested i n part I I , section x i , as the 
formal crux of the concept of perception. Perception involves both sides 
of the distinction. This i s reflected i n the Kantian observation that 
perceptual experience integrates concepts (or language) with 
"intuitions". 
Both Traditional Empiricism^ and Gestalt Psychology overlook that 
"perception" bestrides this categorical distinction, consequently 
placing the concept entirely on one side or the other. According to 
Traditional Empiricism (e.g. Hume), we do not perceive relations 
(e.g. causation) but somehow (and in the case of causation, without 
philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) infer them. The error of this position i s 
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exposed by i t s i n a b i l i t y to provide a coherent account of the kind of 
experience which interested the Gestalt Psychologists. The two ways of 
seeing e.g. Jastrow's "duck-rabbit" figure are, supposedly, not ways of 
seeing at a l l , but merely two different interpretations of the same bare 
experience (of lines on a page), for clearly the figure i t s e l f i s not 
different under each "interpretation". But this means there i s no 
distinction between coming to acknowledge from testimony that the figure 
can be interpreted a certain way, and interpreting i t that way 
oneself.H Clearly, the only way one could come to interpret the figure 
one way or another independently of testimony i s experientially - by 
seeing i t a certain way - which, a f t e r a l l , must i n any case inform 
testimony i t s e l f somewhere along the line. 
The mistake here i s the thought that relations i n themselves are 
not perceived, while "objects" are; but there i s of course no such thing 
as a relation " in i t s e l f " -- to suppose this i s to confuse relations with 
objects, and consequently to confuse our experience of the figure on the 
page with the figure " in i t s e l f " . 
The Gestalt Psychologists (e.g. Kohler), though discerning the 
shortcomings of Traditional Empiricism, are guilty of the same confusion 
only for the opposite reason. The different ways of seeing the figure 
here i s acknowledged to be experiential, but now everything becomes 
subjective and there i s no sense in which the figure i t s e l f i s seen to 
remain the same. Here i t i s the fact that the figure does not i t s e l f 
alter which i s supposedly a matter of inference. But once again, we do 
not rely on testimony to realize t h i s , so this too i s something we 
experience rather than merely "think". 
The apparent paradox i n this kind of experience l i e s i n the fact 
that we experience both the sameness and the difference of the figure 
simultaneously ( i . e . during the same period of time).* 2 Wittgenstein 
reminds us that the categorical disinction between objects and relations 
i s tracked by "two uses of the word 'see'"13; the concept of visual 
perception spans i t . 
Not only are relations perceived, but they are i n an important 
sense dependent on the very external viewpoints that are essential to 
the concept of visual perception. A resemblance i s of a different order 
to, say, a face, since a resemblance i s a relation; and i t i s hard to 
imagine resemblances "existing" independently of their being perceived. 
Berkeley displays the typical empiricist tendency to overlook the 
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categorical distinction here by claiming that nothing exists 
independently of i t s being perceived. 
The relation of resemblance i s an especially apt example in this 
context/ since i t i s the "cement" of empirical concepts. A l l faces 
resemble one another i n a large "family" of ways, but when two 
particular faces are said to resemble each other, they do so more 
strikingly than the usual resemblances which t i e i n various particulars 
under the concept "face". 
In chapter 2 I shall explore and develop an account of how 
experiences involving the sort of double-aspect pictures used i n part 
I I , section x i of the Investigations might be coherently and 
comprehensively represented, following the implications of 
Wittgenstein's treatment. This w i l l t i e i n very closely with some of the 
observations made i n this chapter on acceleration. The remainder of this 
chapter w i l l be concerned with the debate between "direct" and 
"indirect" realism, for which the preceding comments w i l l have obvious 
implications. Some aspects of this debate are i m p l i c i t l y treated by the 
collection of elucidations i n the Investigations, loosely termed the 
"Private Language Argument", which refutes the "inner object" model of 
sensations, and by implication, of what for the indirect r e a l i s t i s 
directly perceived. But section x i of part I I reveals the source of the 
confusion underlying this debate with a deeper focus on i t s crux, 
independently of the success or failure of the Private Language 
Argument. 
The Direct/Indirect Debate 
The direct/indirect debate i s one which so puzzled G.E.Moore that, 
as J.J. Valbergl^ quotes him, he confessed to the inclination to 
believe both apparently incompatible sides of i t . For Valberg, as for 
Moore, i t i s s c i e n t i f i c investigation that creates the philosophical 
problem (the "problematic reasoning") here. Valberg himself offers no 
suggestions for a possible solution, but i s content to present with 
emphatic deliberation the form of the problem i t s e l f . 
The majority of recent writers whose interest i n perception i s 
chiefly s c i e n t i f i c , such as Marr, Campbell, Tye and Eilan, have 
attempted to construct repesentational/computational theories of 
perception, which are essentially sophisticated developments of the 
indirect/inferential model of Traditional Empiricism (although Marr has 
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some a f f i n i t i e s with Gibson). J.J.Gibson is the notable exception, being 
one of the few theorists who subscribe to direct realism. Bruce and 
Green, i n their "Visual Perception"(1990), attempt a synthesis between 
Gibson's "ecological" approach and traditional representational 
theories. This allows that certain aspects of the physical environment 
(e.g. distances, slants and textures) are perceived directly i n terms of 
the structure or pattern of l i g h t (an optic array), rather than being 
"constructed" from "elements of point intensity" (streams of photons) by 
means of inference or computation. As in Gestalt Psychology, spatio-
temporal relations are acknowledged to be directly perceived rather than 
just inferred, yet the internal relations of resemblance essential to 
the concepts we apply i n experience are, supposedly, perceived only 
through the mediation of inference or computation. In their emphasis on 
levels of explanation as a means of reconciling apparently incompatible 
considerations, Bruce and Green agree with Ullman and Marr that some 
form of computational (algorithmic) mediation i s explanatively 
appropriate at a level somewhere between the "ecological" (the level at 
which a person or animal interacts with the environment) and the 
physiological. They "feel that direct theorists have not paid sufficient 
attention to the relationship between ecological and physiological 
levels of explanation."(p.379) 
But the very notion of direct perception i s something indirect 
realism presupposes and trades on. The possibility of indirect realism 
requires that something must be perceived directly to form the basis 
from which higher epistemic levels (concept application) can be 
computed. Gibsonian optics allows the physics of l i g h t structure to take 
up this direct role, i n place of traditional "sense-data". However, 
Gibson himself extends invariants i n l i g h t structure to explain a l l 
levels of perception, and this i s what Bruce and Green object to i n 
Gibsonian theory. In their view, spatial relations such as distances, 
slants and textures are perceived "directly" i n the sense of the eye's 
physical contact with the structure of l i g h t ; on the other hand, what 
one perceives something to be (a different sense of "seeing-as" from 
Wittgenstein's), supposedly can only be inferred or computed from those 
basic spatio-temporal elements by means of knowledge of the world. The 
basic spatial relations which are perceived directly are, allegedly, 
items of information "contained" i n , and "provided" by, invariants i n 
l i g h t structure; our computations mediate between these and our 
perceptions, i n the f u l l , epistemic sense of "perception". 
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There are three related confusions i n this account= The f i r s t 
concerns the role of knowledge of the world in the computational 
process; the second concerns the notion of "information" being 
"contained" i n l i g h t structure; the t h i r d i s a consequence of the other 
two confusions, such that perception is forced into only one side of the 
relation between percipient and perceptum (the perceptum now relates to 
"a perception", instead of a percipient)•» I shall b r i e f l y outline the 
nature of each of these confusions, then expand and t r y to resolve the 
confusions i n the l i g h t of what has been said so far i n t h i s chapter. 
l»The computation of higher epistemic levels of perception based 
on the structure of l i g h t requires knowledge of the world (other than 
the basic spatial relations), so presumably this knowledge i t s e l f , being 
of a higher order than the basic spatial relations, had to be computed; 
i n which case, i t too required some other knowledge of the world (other 
than the basic spatial relations), which also had to be computed, and so 
on ad infinitum. The question i s , therefore, how did we ever acquire the 
knowledge necessary for the computations necessary for higher level 
perception? The only way i n which the computational process i s a 
possible explanation of the higher epistemic levels of perception, is i f 
i t i s not necessary! Furthermore, as an explanation this i s viciously 
circular, since i t requires the explanandum as part of the explanans. 
2. An item of information i s a linguistic item. Information i s 
"contained" i n language, not i n nature. 1 5 
3. Perception i s a relational concept, not an "object" concept - i t 
cannot be crammed into only one side of the two places which comprise i t 
at the level of i t s use. 
In the f i r s t case, according to Bruce and Green, we know that x i s 
a pencil by carrying out a process of computation based on certain 
directly perceived invariants i n l i g h t structure plus, crucially, what 
we already know or "remember" about pencils i n general. The assumption 
seems to be that because the higher epistemic levels involve cultural 
elements ( i . e . concepts), that these are manufactured or constructed by 
the percipient. They are certainly the result of human a c t i v i t y , but are 
not "constructed" separately by each individual; rather, as systems of 
rules they emerge in social interaction, and are learned by each 
individual as a necessary condition for our understanding of the world 
in some way. I f the conceptual aspects of perception are computed from 
more basic elements, then these systems of rules are computed; but then 
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the question arises of x-jnat rules are followed i n the computation of 
these ruleso A computation must follow rules - i t cannot create theme 
The rules of language are what we "already know" i f we understand a 
concept, not what we must compute i n order to individually manufacture 
concepts (which are i n any case a necessary precondition for any such 
computation) . 
The second confusion i s one that crosses the categorical 
distinction between the space-time of objects and that of language 
(concepts)= Structures of l i g h t , optic arrays, tree-stumps, and so on, 
are no more items of information than they are subjects of truth or 
falsityo I t i s what i s said of such things that carries information i f 
true, or misinformation i f false. As i n the t h i r d case, the tendency 
here i s to cram what i s essentially comprised by a two-place relation 
spanning this categorical distinction into one side of that relation.. 
Hence, information allegedly l i e s around i n the world independently of 
human cognition, and we supposedly "have perceptions" independently 
(except i n some contingently causal sense) of the objects that occupy 
the second place of the relation between percipient and perceptum. The 
remainder of thi s chapter w i l l be concerned to expose and resolve the 
th i r d confusion, bringing us back centrally to the concept of perception 
i t s e l f o 
Whatever confusions Bruce and Green inherit from both Gibsonian 
and traditional theory, credit must go to them for emphasising the 
Gibsonian insight into the "the importance of describing what animals 
and people do i n their worlds and how they do it " ( p . 3 9 1 ) 1 6 to the study 
of perception; for this "ecological" level of description i s indeed 
Wittgenstein's "proto-phenomenon", to which we must return for the de 
facto i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the concept of perception. But as a "proto-
phenomenon" i t i s inappropriately considered a level of explanation at 
a l l , since i t i s precisely "what animals and people do...and how they do 
i t " which, from the theoretical point of view, requires an explanation. 
Equally, however, i t requires no explanation, since i t i s what we 
already know; moreover, i t i s what we must already know i n order to have 
any understanding of the world at a l l . What happens at the ecological 
level presents anomalies requiring explanation only i n the l i g h t of 
erroneous theories, and provides explanations only i n the sense of 
showing that a certain theory must be wrong or incomplete. The kind of 
question we might genuinely seek an explanation for with respect to 
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perception would be something l i k e ; "what i s i t about people and animals 
and the world that enables people and animals to move about i n , and 
experience, the world i n the way they do"; this i s a sc i e n t i f i c question 
and we would then be looking for those physical properties which are 
necessary conditions for perception, rather than trying i n this way to 
answer the question of what perception is - a question properly 
concerning the rules comprising the concept, which of course inhabit the 
"ecological" level„ Any such "explanation" must take a consistent 
mereological step, wherein none of the original relata of the concept 
w i l l be involved i n the terms of the description. 
The concept of perception at the proto-phenomenal level involves a 
two-place relation between percipient and percepturn; l i k e any two-place 
relation, t h i s i s inappropriately described either as "direct" or as 
"indirect"o A snooker b a l l only indirectly h i t s another i f three snooker 
balls are involved i n the overall relation; without introducing a 
concept that fixes the number of relata, i t i s appropriate to speak of 
whether any particular snooker bal l has directly or indirectly struck 
another. But i f we concentrate exclusively on the relationship between 
two snooker balls, the question of whether or not one strikes the other 
"directly" or "indirectly" becomes fatuous. The s c i e n t i f i c discovery 
that snooker balls, l i k e everything else, are composed of atoms and that 
atoms repel each other by means of their force-fields, does not mean 
that snooker balls never make "direct contact", but rather that this i s 
precisely what "direct contact" involves ( i . e . science may alter our 
views about what physical conditions are necessary for contact between 
solid objects, without altering the concept i t s e l f - but then i t was 
science which gave us these views in the f i r s t place). The way clouds 
behave may be explained by taking the mereological step to the level of 
water droplets. But having made this categorical s h i f t , i t would be an 
error to suppose that water droplets mediate between clouds and, say, 
rain. Similarly, i t would be an error to suppose that sub-atomic force-
fields mediate between striking snooker balls. 
The question of whether perception i s "direct" or "indirect" i s 
appropriate only when the number of relata i s not fixed; for example, i f 
a scene i s perceived i n a mirror or on television, the scene would 
correctly be described as being perceived indirectly, since this i s 
opposed to the possibility of perceiving the scene without the aid of a 
mirror or a television. Indirect realism commits the categorical 
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inconsistency of importing a property of one of the original relata into 
the level of the original relation i t s e l f - hence, i t i s we who do not 
perceive things "directly". There i s , a f t e r a l l , no possibility of 
visually perceiving things without l i g h t , eyes and a brain, so i t makes 
no sense to speak of unaided perception as either "direct" or 
"indirect". 
The sense i n which Bruce and Green accept "direct" perception i s 
in terms of invariants i n the structure of l i g h t , which make "direct 
contact" with the eye. But since objects such as pencils are separated 
from the eye by the very space occupied by the structure of l i g h t , as 
well as by epistemic considerations, the perception of these i s held to 
be "indirect", mediated by the physical and epistemic space-time of 
l i g h t structure and computation. 
Light structure and epistemic considerations are, however, 
necessary conditions for perception. I t i s because of the space between 
eye and object, and the l i g h t structure that "occupies" i t , that the 
object i s perceived at a l l . I t i s as much a confusion to say that l i g h t 
structure and epistemic considerations mediate between us and what we 
perceive, as i t i s to say that our eyes and brains do so. The original 
concept of perception i s comprised by a two-place spatial relation, not 
a non-spatial "contact" between spaces, or a three-place spatial 
relation; neither can i t include the space between the relata without 
including both relata. 
This confusion of certain necessary conditions for perception with 
the object of perception, produces a picture of perception i n which the 
categorical distinction identified by Wittgenstein i s distorted to f i t 
the incoherent distinction between direct and indirect realism. 
Consequently, i n so far as perception, allegedly, i s i n one sense 
direct, the original relation of the concept i s crammed into one side of 
a new relation which corresponds to perception i n so far as, allegedly, 
i t i s i n another sense indirect. This confused picture refocuses the 
original relation between percipient and perceptum into an apparent 
relation holding between perception and the object perceived, which i s 
to treat perception as i f i t were only one of the two relata necessary 
to the concept ( i . e . , as i f i t were an object). 
Gibson's direct realism perpetuates this confusion i n the way that 
Gestalt Psychology perpetuates the confusion of Traditional Empiricism. 
Bruce and Green's synthesis unfortunately only finds a compromise 
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between the two positions and does not resolve the confusion underlying 
the conflicto 
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As promised i n chapter 1, this chapter i s concerned to develop a 
coherent description of the type of experience Wittgenstein calls 
"noticing an aspect", which forms the main subject of part I I , section 
x i of the Investigations. The whole of this section, including the well 
known "paradoxical" schemata, f i r s t appeared i n Philosophical Grammar 
I I . 
The "Two uses of the word "see1 which i n i t i a t e Wittgenstein's 
discussion of "noticing an aspect" correspond to two categorically 
distinct uses of the word "object"; a relation such as a resemblance 
between two faces i s an "'object' of sight", but is obviously not an 
"object" i n the sense that a face or a chair i s . No description, drawing 
or copy of a likeness between two faces can be produced independently of 
a description, drawing or copy of the faces themselves. Each face, on 
the other hand, can be described, drawn or copied independently of the 
other. The resemblance between them, though, might s t i l l be seen " i n " 
one or the other, and then the relation of resemblance becomes an 
internal one. 
The distinction I shall use between "Traditional Empiricism" and 
"Radical Empiricism" i s perhaps not the usual one, which would place 
Berkeley and Hume on the "Radical" side. I shall c a l l their brand of 
idealism "Traditional" i n the sense that i t retains an atomistic 
conception of experience that has been a constant feature of Br i t i s h 
Empiricism since Hobbes and Locke. By "Radical Empiricism" I refer to a 
position that retains Humean idealism while admitting a more ho l i s t i c or 
organic conception of "the given", exemplified by William James and 
Wolfgang Kqhler. 
As Wittgenstein indicates, a coherent description of noticing an 
aspect crucially hinges on the discerned difference of category. Both 
Traditional and Radical Empiricism f a i l to capture the essential 
characteristics of "noticing an aspect" through their f a i l u r e to place 
this difference of category appropriately within the concept of visual 
perception. Indeed, the way i n which neither position finds i t possible 
to give an adequate account of "noticing aspects" highlights the 
misconception that i s shared by each at i t s core. 
In part I I shall develop a description based on Wittgenstein's 
insights, i n the l i g h t of the observations made in chapter 1 concerning 
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the representation of acceleration, which w i l l show how the difference 
between "noticing an aspect" and "continuous aspect perception" ("seeing 
-as") parallels i n certain formal respects (but differs from i n some 
others), the difference between acceleration and constant speed. 
Following this I shall discuss and c r i t i c i z e , i n part I I , Christopher 
Peacocke's use of "noticing aspects" to support his distinction between 
"representational" and "sensational" content i n experience;1 and i n 
part I I I , Stephen Mulhall's emphasis on "continuous aspect perception" 
as the significant point of Wittgenstein's comments i n thi s part of the 
Investigations.2 
I 
At the outset of his discussion of "noticing an aspect", Wittgenstein 
gives a brief characterization of the type of experience i n question; 
" I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice i t s likeness to 
another- I see that i t has not changed; and yet I see i t 
differently. I c a l l this experience 'noticing an aspect*."3 
There are two important points here: 1)seeing the face differently 
occurs during the period of time i n which i t i s seen not to have 
changed; 2)the sameness and the difference are both seen. 
Traditional and Radical Empiricism can accommodate 1) (in modified 
form) only by rejecting 2). Traditional Empiricism denies that the 
difference i s seen, while Radical Empiricism inadvertently prevents the 
possibility of the sameness being seen. Notice that Wittgenstein 
it a l i c i z e s "see" i n the context of seeing that the face has not changed; 
his target here i s clearly Radical Empiricism (e.g William James and 
Wolfgang Kohler) 4. The two senses of "see" f a c i l i t a t e the accommodation 
of both 1) and 2), since what i s seen differently i s categorically (not 
physically) distinct from what i s seen not to have changed; the 
difference rides over the sameness on a different "level" ( i n the sense 
that Orion inhabits a different "level" to the stars which comprise that 
constellation). With this insight at hand, a l l that remains is to 
describe the way one level "rides" upon the other temporally and 
spatially ( i . e . , the temporal and spatial relationships obtaining 
between 
the two levels). 
Before going on to do this I shall b r i e f l y expand on the way 
Traditional and Radical Empiricism both f a i l to incorporate the 
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categorical distinction; they do so by trying to cram the concept of 
perception into one level or the other, instead of allowing i t to span 
both levels. Hence, according to Traditional Empiricism, our "objects of 
sight" are confined to "objects" i n the sense of individuals or 
"simples", while a l l relationships between them, including internal or 
epistemic ones, are inferred or interpreted. To remain consistent we are 
now forced to deny that the "simples" we perceive "directly" are "trees" 
or "faces", since the internal relations which t i e various particulars 
under the concept "tree" or "face" e t c have to be inferred from a basis 
devoid of any conceptual element - but why necessarily a psychological 
"object" such as a "sense-impression" or "-datum", rather than a 
physical object merely unclassified? In order to see a sense-impression 
we surely just as much require the concept "sense-impression"? The 
original categorical distinction i s distorted into an apparent 
distinction between what i s "directly" perceived ( i . e . sense-data), and 
what i s only "indirectly" perceived by means of inference, or merely 
interpreted.(Since experience of the bare sense-datum has no conceptual 
element, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how this i s perceived, directly or 
otherwise; and since the epistemic levels are a matter of interpretation 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how perception i s possible even "indirectly".) 
Wittgenstein's categorical distinction clearly does not divide a l l 
epistemic levels from a "purely sensory" one, but rather distinguishes 
different epistemic levels - a face l i e s on a different epistemic level 
to a resemblance between two faces, just as the stars comprising Orion 
l i e on a different level to the constellation of Orion. Whatever 
mereologicalS level i s reached, our perception has an epistemic 
element. Unless this point i s taken on board the position collapses back 
into Indirect Realism - a fate that awaits Godfrey Vesey's 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's categorical distinction i n terms of 
optic/epistemic appearance.6 Vesey i s closer to Peacocke than to 
Wittgenstein, but I shall reserve Peacocke for part I I . 
Radical Empiricism^ i s obviously a reaction to the impossible 
situation of Traditional Empiricism but i t makes the same mistake of 
cramming a l l our "objects of sight" onto one level - the other level of 
course. We now directly perceive "organized wholes", but the constituent 
parts are taken up into the wholes i n such a way that they no longer 
occupy a different epistemic level. Consequently there can be no change 
at one level without a change at the other. Instead, there i s a "flexing 
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of the visual f i e l d " when the "rabbit" aspect of the "duck-rabbit" 
figure i s suddenly noticed.4 The noticing therefore does not, 
apparently, take place at any epistemic level, but at a physical level 
i n a spatially enriched sensory f i e l d . This makes the "visual 
impression" a "queerly shifting construction" or "chimera". There i s now 
no possibility that what i s seen differently also appears the same; the 
sameness must now become a matter of inference ("we a l l know that 
drawings in books do not suddenly "flex', so I know this one didn't") -
an inversion of Traditional Empiricism. 
Now I shall go on to give a f u l l e r account of the temporal and 
spatial relationships between the two levels of perception, i n terms of 
which the experience of "noticing an aspect" is coherently described. 
The distinction between "noticing an aspect" and "continuous aspect 
perception" w i l l emerge clearly i n this description. I t w i l l be 
convenient to label the two levels " I s * ' " and "2 n d" sense of seeing? 
the 1 s t i s the sense in which " I see this (e.g. a face)", and the 2 n d 
i s the sense i n which " I see a likeness between these two faces". 
I f I look at the "duck-rabbit" figure and "see i t as" a duck-
picture without noticing the rabbit aspect, my seeing the duck aspect i s 
continuous. The beginning of my seeing the figure as a duck-picture 
coincides with the beginning of my seeing the figure at a l l . 
Consequently i t i s inappropriate to say that I notice the duck aspect. 
But then perhaps a question arises: i n what sense am I seeing an aspect 
= seeing the figure as a duck-picture - for what i s my seeing i t this 
way opposed to? Are there really two epistemic levels involved here at 
all? My conclusion i s that there are because what i s seen i s a 
representation. As Wittgenstein points out, we do not "take" a knife and 
fork "for" cutlery - we would not say " I see this as a knife and fork", 
precisely because i t i s not a representation. Being a knife and fork i s 
not something we notice about something which might be described on 
another epistemic level; and seeing (possibly without noticing) the 
knife and fork does not involve any epistemic level other than the two 
consisting of l)the concepts "knife" and "fork", and 2)the (relational) 
concept "and". (Seeing the knife and fork "as" a knife and fork i s not 
opposed to anything else i t might be taken to be.) This i s not so in the 
case of a representation - a drawing or copy. When we see a knife and 
fork we are aware that what we see i s a knife and fork. But when we see 
a picture of a duck we are aware that what we see i s not a duck. What we 
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see is a picture; i f i t were an o i l painting we might describe the shape 
of the canvas, style of frame, texture of the paint, and so on. 
But we see the intentional^ "object" depicted thereby as a duck. This i s 
not something we notice about the picture, but i s something about the 
picture we see. The "object" seen i n the 2 n d sense here might even ba 
characterized as a resemblance between the picture and the kind of thing 
depicted (whereas words do not resemble their meanings). Seeing this 
resemblance i s unlikely to begin after the start of seeing the picture, 
though i t i s possible (whereas i t s beginning before i s obviously 
impossible). 
This gives an outline of the concept of "seeing-as" or "continuous 
aspect perception". I t does not depend on noticing an aspect, but 
noticing an aspect depends on seeing-as i n the way that acceleration 
depends on constant speed. When " I suddenly notice a likeness between 
two faces", my seeing i n the 2 n d sense begins after the start of my 
seeing i n the 1 s t sense. My noticing i n this case does not occur after 
the start of a period of seeing i n the 2 n d sense, so noticing an aspect 
does not depend on a prior period of seeing-as. Rather, i t i s dependent 
on (and inseparable from) the period of seeing-as i t marks the start of, 
quite generally. Obviously the reverse dependency obtains whenever the 
start of a period of seeing-as i s marked by noticing an aspect, but 
since the start of a period of seeing-as i s not necessarily marked by 
the noticing of an aspect, seeing-as does not depend on noticing an 
aspect generally. 
Now the double-aspect schemata such as the "duck-rabbit" provide 
cases i n which, as i n the "faces" example, the start of a period of 
seeing-as i s marked by noticing an aspect, provided both aspects are 
seen; but unlike the "faces" example, the noticing also marks the end of 
a previous period of seeing-as. Both aspects cannot possibly be seen 
without noticing one or the other of them. Noticing the aspect i n this 
case marks a l i m i t between periods; the two periods not only never 
coincide temporally, they never even overlap. This i s because the two 
periods occupy the same level - the 2 n d sense of seeing. But the two 
periods on this level occur during a period of seeing i n the 1 s t sense 
whose l i m i t s at start and f i n i s h may or may not extend beyond the l i m i t s 
of both periods on the 2 n d level. 
The indexicality of the expression of noticing an aspect is 
therefore temporal - "Now I see i t as a rabbit!". The change i n aspect 
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i s expressed by the indexical "now". The change here parallels the 
change i n speed during acceleration; but unlike acceleration, this 
change does not continue, so does not i t s e l f require a period of time, 
but is_ a l i m i t between periods of time. The equivalent i n acceleration 
would be where "now" expresses the noticing of the beginning of a change 
in speed, ju s t as "Ouch!" expresses the beginning of a period of 
(perhaps diminishing) pain. Of course "now" i s not always used as an 
"ausserung"10, but can be used to designate a period of time. 
A change i n the velocity of a moving body i s noticeable at a 
specific time (within a given time-system). Here the change i s noticed, 
whereas i n noticing an aspect, the change is the noticing. But the 
li m i t s which define a particular acceleration value (a lin g u i s t i c item), 
are l i k e the l i m i t which is_ the noticing of an aspect, i n that neither 
can be "fixed" i n an absolute sense (or rather, i n the sense that an 
atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima at a specific time and date within 
the time-system of the Earth); there i s no "fixed" time at which the 
rabbit aspect of the duck-rabbit figure i s noticable. Different people 
w i l l say "Now I see i t as a rabbit" at different (Earth-system) times, 
even i f they started seeing the figure at the same (Earth-system) time. 
(When I say "Now I am seeing i t as a rabbit", perhaps I am using "Now" 
both to express the change and to designate the period of seeing the 
rabbit aspect.) There i s a mereological order of time-systems - each of 
us i s a time-system within the time-system of the Earth. 
In the case of continuous aspect perception, there i s no indexical 
expression, but a spatial, as opposed to temporal, viewpoint r e l a t i v i t y . 
I might report my perception of the duck-rabbit figure i n the way I 
would report my perception of one of the animals i t depicts - " I t ' s a 
duck". I report th i s as i f I were seeing a duck in the 1 s t sense, though 
of course I am really reporting a perception i n the 2n<* sense - i.e., 
a period of seeing-as. 
I f I only ever see the figure as a duck-picture, then the periods 
of seeing i n each sense always coincide with one another. But i t i s 
s t i l l appropriate to say I am seeing an aspect, since th i s i s opposed to 
a different aspect which someone else might see. Someone else might only 
ever see the figure as a rabbit-picture. The two aspects are then not 
divided by a noticing and seen one after the other by a single person; 
instead they are seen from different parts of space, possibly during the 
same period of time, or during overlapping periods of time, by two 
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people. But what they see differently in the 2nc* sense, they see the 
same in the 1 s t sense. 
I I 
In chapter 1 of Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke rejects 
Wittgenstein's schemata as unsuitable for i l l u s t r a t i n g the distinction 
he wishes to draw between "sensational" and "representational" (or 
propositional) content i n perceptual experience. Peacocke i s quite right 
to do so, since his intended distinction i s not the categorical one 
Wittgenstein draws, though I suspect Peacocke thinks i t i s and intends 
the wire cube as a better way of i l l u s t r a t i n g i t than the schemata; 
certainly he thinks he i s talking about "noticing an aspect". 
As noted i n part I of the present chapter, Wittgenstein's 
Categorical distinction distinguishes two epistemic or propositional 
levels, not a l l epistemic levels from a "purely sensory" one. Godfrey 
Vesey interprets Wittgenstein's distinction i n Peacockean terms by 
distinguishing "optic" and "epistemic" appearance. This position 
collapses into the very position Wittgenstein escapes - Traditional 
Empiricism. Vesey i s obviously unaware of t h i s , as he thinks he i s 
stating Wittgenstein's position. Peacocke, on the other hand, perhaps 
does not pretend to be other than an Indirect Realist, since he 
e x p l i c i t l y subscribes to the representational theory of perception. But 
Peacocke may not be aware that he i s not describing "noticing an aspect" 
at a l l , since his distinction i s not a categorical one; i t does not 
distinguish sensational from epistemic concepts, but the sensational 
from the conceptual (a categorical distinction can of course only 
distinguish between conceptual levels). 
"Sensational content" possibly corresponds to the Kantian "given" 
- the "intuitions" of empirical r e a l i t y . Peacocke may be caught under 
the spell of a misleading Kantian metaphor; intuitions without concepts 
are "blind", and concepts without intuitions are "empty". This metaphor 
goes some way towards capturing the inter-dependency of sensations and 
concepts i n experience, but does not go far enough. An i n t u i t i o n would 
s t i l l seem independently i n t e l l i g i b l e even i f i t were "blind" (blindness 
i s , a f t e r a l l , a property of something); and a concept would seem to be 
some kind of pre-existent container waiting to be f i l l e d , i f i t were 
merely "empty". This reflects Kant's Newtonian conception of absolute 
space and time (imagine non-spatial, non-temporal matter waiting to 
" f i l l " non-physical space and time); less obviously, i t also reflects 
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the Kantian distinction between empirical and noumenal r e a l i t y . Noumenal 
re a l i t y i s epistemically inaccessible, so ex hypothesi, the concept of 
noumanal r e a l i t y must be i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of the twelve 
categories which mark the l i m i t s of our understanding i n Kant's 
philosophy (a contradiction of course). And this must also apply to 
"intuitions", since none of the concepts which make intuitions 
i n t e l l i g i b l e i s the concept of an i n t u i t i o n . While concepts and 
"intuitions" are required to be independently i n t e l l i g i b l e (in the way 
that form and content are not), even to the small extent that Kant 
allows, we face an i n f i n i t e regress of empirical and noumenal r e a l i t y . 
The d i f f i c u l t y facing Peacocke's representationalism i s of the same 
kind. "Sensational content" would require i t s own level of propositional 
content to render that concept independently i n t e l l i g i b l e (as i t must be 
to serve Peacocke's thesis); yet this possibility i s ruled out by the 
distinction i t s e l f ; l i k e "intuitions", "sensational content" becomes as 
noumenal as whatever i t i s ( i f anything) that the representational 
theory of perception supposes our perceptions "represent". 
I f we do describe those perceived aspects which Peacocke labels 
"sensational content" - e.g. the proportion of the visual f i e l d an 
object occupies, or the shape an object presents on a plane 
perpendicular to a particular l i n e of sight - we do so by using a host 
of appropriate concepts, such as "two-thirds" or "ellipse" (and these 
concepts might be applied i n contexts other than visual fields and 
perspectival planes). What Peacocke calls "sensational content" (of 
perception), I shall c a l l "viewpoint-relative aspects of states of 
a f f a i r s " 1 1 ; for these features are not described i n terms of sensation 
concepts. 
The issue here would be a mere quibble over terminology i f by 
"sensational content" Peacocke actually meant "viewpoint-relative 
aspects of states of af f a i r s " ; for this does draw attention to an 
epistemic distinction that Radical Empiricism obliterates (Radical 
Empiricism puts colour and shape on the same level as "organization", as 
Wittgenstein points out 1^.) However, Peacocke's intention i s to use 
this distinction to support the thesis that experience i s not entirely 
captured by concepts - that "sensational content" l i e s outside the 
epistemic net. The distinction i s supposed to lend weight to the thesis 
by explaining certain perceptual phenomena (what Peacocke takes to be 
"noticing an aspect") by means of i t . Since the viewpoint-relative 
aspects of states of affairs are, allegedly, not only i n t e l l i g i b l e 
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independently of propositional content, but are devoid of i t , they ought 
t o be l i k e Kantian i n t u i t i o n s without concepts - i . e . , "blind"„ 
My conclusion w i l l be that the viewpoint-relative aspects of 
states of a f f a i r s are instrumental i n describing the wire cube 
experience, but do not "explain" i t ; and, furthermore, that t h i s goes no 
way towards supporting the thesis that "sensational content" l i e s 
outside the epistemic net. Peacocke would have given better support t o 
t h i s p o s i t i o n had "sensational content" more t o do w i t h sensations than 
w i t h the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of a f f a i r s . I n the 
remainder of t h i s section I s h a l l , f i r s t l y , discuss the case of the wire 
cube i n r e l a t i o n t o Peacocke's thesis and t o the concept of "noticing an 
aspect"; then I s h a l l suggest the kind of experiences which might more 
reasonably be thought t o lack any propositional content. 
Peacocke's reason f o r t r y i n g t o elucidate the concept of "noticing 
an aspect" by describing a c e r t a i n v i s u a l experience engendered by a 
wire cube, rather than by an ambiguous l i n e drawing of the kind used by 
Wittgenstein, i s that a l i n e drawing i s a representation. The 
application of Peacocke's d i s t i n c t i o n t o a representation would put 
representational content on a meta-propositional l e v e l - an unnecessary 
complication f o r Peacocke's purposes. Wittgenstein makes i t clear t h a t 
the concept of "noticing an aspect" i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o ambiguous 
representations w i t h h i s i n i t i a l example of the faces. However, when 
notici n g an aspect does not involve a representation, i t does involve a 
relationship between two objects, though t h i s may be an i n t e r n a l one. 
Peacocke's example, on the other hand, involves only one object. What i s 
important about t h i s one object i s of course the s p a t i a l relationships 
between i t s parts and the observer; but there i s an important difference 
between purely s p a t i a l relationships and epistemic ones. Spatial levels 
are obviously not categorical levels. I n f a c t the case of the wire cube 
does not f i t the concept of "noticing an aspect" f o r a number of 
reasons; moreover, i t does not provide the kind of experience that 
Peacocke requires f o r h i s own purpose. Peacocke requires an experience 
t h a t , he thinks, only the d i s t i n c t i o n between sensational and 
representational content can "explain". Noticing an aspect provides the 
necessary " a i r of paradox" created by seeing something d i f f e r e n t l y and, 
during the same period of time, seeing that i t has not changed. 
Unfortunately f o r Peacocke, t h i s does not characterize the experience 
involving the wire cube. 
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The c r u c i a l difference between Peacocke's example and no t i c i n g an 
aspect i s i d e n t i f i e d by Malcolm Budd^s the wire cubs looks t o be f i r s t 
one way, then another; of the two faces perpendicular t o the observer's 
l i n e of si g h t , the one that f i r s t appears t o be the more dist a n t 
suddenly appears t o be the nearer (and vice-versa of course)„ By 
contrast, there i s no sense i n which the duck or the r a b b i t aspect of 
the "duck-rabbit" f i g u r e gives i t the appearance of being a duck or a 
ra b b i t , or i n which the resemblance between two faces gives one face the 
appearance of being the other. 
Budd's b r i e f observation can be expanded t o show how the wire cube 
example f a i l s t o serve Peacocke's own purpose. Although one may not be 
able t o decide which of the two ways the cube appears t o be i s the way 
i t i s , there i s a r e a l question of i t s being e i t h e r one way or the 
other. I t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible f o r one face of the cube t o be both 
the nearer and the more dist a n t from only one viewpoint and without the 
r o t a t i o n of the cube i n time and space„ I t i s therefore a matter of 
deductive inference (on pain of a reductio ad absurdum) t h a t while one 
of the ways the cube appears t o be i s r e a l l y the way i t i s , the other 
way i t appears t o be i s an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n . This i s true not so much i n 
spite of, but because of the f a c t that one might not know which way i s 
which, and of the f a c t that the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two ways i s as 
viewpoint-relative and, possibly, as empirically indiscernible ( i n an 
absolute sense) as the d i s t i n c t i o n between any two s p a t i a l dimensions. 
But i n the case of no t i c i n g an aspect, t h i s i s simply not an issue. 
Neither of the two ways i n which the duck-rabbit f i g u r e can be seen i s 
an i l l u s i o n , since a l l that i s l o g i c a l l y ruled out i s t h a t both aspects 
can be seen simultaneously by the same person. Moreover, whichever of 
the two ways the wire cube appears t o be i s the o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n , though 
a viewpoint-relative aspect of the cube, obviously cannot be a perceived 
aspect of the cube (because the cube i s perceived from the opposite 
viewpoint). 
The f a t a l consequence f o r Peacocke i s that while the o r i e n t a t i o n 
of the wire cube appears t o have reversed, there i s nothing l e f t t o 
appear not t o have changed, precisely because the experience involves an 
o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n . I t i s , rather, a question of i n f e r r i n g that the wire 
cube has not changed from the f a c t t h a t , without the physical r o t a t i o n 
of the cube i n r e l a t i o n t o the viewpoint, or vice-versa, the or i e n t a t i o n 
of the cube could not possibly have reversed. 
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To be f a i r t o Peacocke, i t might be thought that the isomorphism 
of both apparent ways i s what appears not t o change«, Of course the cube 
i s isomorphic w i t h i t s e l f whatever the o r i e n t a t i o n , so i t i s only the 
shapes of 2-d translations of d i f f e r e n t orientations that could be non-
isomorphic; but there are not two orientations here t o appear isomorphic 
i n 2-d t r a n s l a t i o n , f o r the orientation i s r e l a t i v e t o a single 
viewpoint. The duck-rabbit f i g u r e , on the other hand, i l l u s t r a t e s that a 
duck's head and a rabbit's head can present (unexpectedly) congruent 
shapes i n 2-d t r a n s l a t i o n ; neither the duck aspect nor the rabbit aspect 
i s an i l l u s i o n , as the f i g u r e does not appear t o be a duck or a rabbit., 
What the f i g u r e appears t o be i s a rudimentary 2-d t r a n s l a t i o n of both a 
duck's and a rabbit's head, though i t looks t o be a representation whose 
st y l i z e d s i m p l i c i t y i s exploited t o produce an approximation of the 
shape that duck's and rabbit's heads i n general have i n common, rather 
than one copied from any p a r t i c u l a r duck's or rabbit's head. 
Even i f we supposed th a t the i l l u s i o n of change i n the wire cube 
example were underlaid by an appearance of non-change, i t would not 
support Peacocke's thesis <, For i f the appearance of difference i s 
captured conceptually* 4 (which i t i s , on the l e v e l of the relationship 
between cube and viewpoint) then the appearance of sameness c e r t a i n l y 
would be, since i t would be described i n the same viewpoint-relative 
terms (as indeed the actual sameness i s ) ; and i f the appearance of 
difference i s not captured propositionally, then neither i s the 
appearance of sameness, since neither can be described independently of 
the same viewpoint-relative terms. I n other words, the o r i e n t a t i o n a l 
appearance of the wire cube i s described i n exactly the same terms as 
i t s actual o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h respect t o d i f f e r e n t viewpoints. 
So, something other than the viewpoint-relative aspects of states 
of a f f a i r s i s required t o exemplify non-propositional content. 
Our experience c e r t a i n l y involves sensations which have nothing t o do 
with how things are outside our own bodies. We tend t o th i n k of 
sensations i n exclusively f l e s h l y terms - pains, itches, etc. ( j u s t as 
we tend t o neglect perceptual modalities other than the v i s u a l ) ; we 
also, f o r example, experience visual and aural sensations. With a rapid 
change of a l t i t u d e , we usually experience not j u s t pains i n our ears, 
but certain aural sensations which we describe as i f they were sounds -
"a high pitched whine", say. The vis u a l equivalent would be something 
l i k e "seeing stars" when subjected t o a v i o l e n t blow. After-images also 
come i n t o the category of vi s u a l sensations, and again we describe these 
30 
i n the terms we would use t o describe objects - only i n t h i s case, at 
the l e v e l of colours and shapes; the colours may be the opposite of 
those of the objects the after-image i s an image of, but the shapes are 
generally the same., There i s no aural equivalent of after-images, since 
the way l i g h t a f f e c t s the r e t i n a i s so d i f f e r e n t t o the way sound 
affects the ear-drum; but very loud noises may leave a "ringing i n the 
ears" a f t e r they have stopped (and are heard to have stopped). 
Sensations such as these do not form part of perception i n the 
ordinary sense ( i . e . perception of how things are outside our own 
bodies); rather, they are experienced e f f e c t s of the necessary 
conditions f o r perception.. Whether or not there i s any other sense of 
"perception" which applies, f o r example, t o kinaesthetic sensations w i l l 
be the subject of chapter 3„ 
I I I 
Because Peacocke's wire-cube experience involves an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n , 
t h i s case requires an explanation; i t i s pertinent t o know the physical/ 
physiological causes of the illusion.. By contrast, no more would be 
revealed about n o t i c i n g an aspect by discovering i t s physical causes, 
than would be learned about a chess-piece by discovering i t s physical 
properties. 
This point applies t o perception quite generally. Only i n a case 
of genuine i l l u s i o n i s an explanation required t o make sense of the 
experience. Otherwise, what i s required i s a coherent description, 
Wittgenstein indicates as much when, on p.211 of P I , he touches on the 
subject of looking without seeings '"Just now I looked a t the shape 
rather than at the colour.• Do not l e t such phrases confuse you. Above 
a l l , don't wonder 'what can be going on i n the eyes or brain?" 1 To make 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o int, Wittgenstein does not need t o r e s t r i c t himself t o 
noti c i n g an aspect, or seeing-as, f o r , l i k e the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
seeing and i n t e r p r e t i n g , i t applies t o seeing quite generally. 
As mentioned i n chapter 1, the categorical d i s t i n c t i o n involved i n 
notici n g an aspect i s a s p e c i f i c manifestation of a universal boundary 
defining the nature of philosophy against that of science. The two 
senses of seeing span t h i s boundary, and reveal i t i n the experience of 
notici n g an aspect. But i f only one of these senses (the more general 
sense on which seeing-as i s supervenient) i s made t o span i t , then the 
coherence of the d i s t i n c t i o n i s l o s t e n t i r e l y ; i t i s no longer a 
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d i s t i n c t i o n between epistemic levels, but between a l l epistemic levels 
and a l e v e l t h a t , p u t a t i v e l y , no epistemic l e v e l has access t o . This i s 
the quasi-noumenal realm of Peacocke's "sensational content" or Vesey's 
"optic appearance". 
Though vaguely allowing that "noticing an aspect" i s a special 
case of seeing, Stephen Mulhall's claim i n h i s book On Being i n the 
World i s t h a t "continuous aspect perception" (or "seeing-as"), i s 
applicable, at least i n a sense, t o perception generally ( i . e . t o seeing 
i n the f i r s t sense). Although "continuous aspect perception" does not 
necessarily involve no t i c i n g an aspect, and the l a t t e r merely reveals 
the former, the former i s distinguished from seeing i n the 1st sense i n 
that i t involves both senses, as does noticing an aspect. The difference 
between the l a s t two concepts has t o do w i t h the difference between 
not i c i n g (quite generally), and seeing (quite generally), not between 
what applies only t o seeing i n the 2n(* sense and what applies t o seeing 
i n either sense. The concept of "continuous aspect perception" must be 
distinguished from seeing i n the 1st sense by the categorical 
d i s t i n c t i o n the former spans and the l a t t e r does not, i n order t o 
preserve i t s coherence as a concept. I t ' s generalization t o seeing i n 
the 1st sense serves merely t o o b l i t e r a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n and hence i t s 
own coherence. What makes the concept of "seeing-as" coherent i s what 
makes the concept of seeing a p i c t o r i a l representation (or a 
resemblance) coherent, and that i s what makes both concepts d i f f e r e n t t o 
that of seeing i n the 1st sense. 
Noticing an aspect i s obviously l i k e noticing i n general, i n tha t 
both are no t i c i n g ; but the difference i s c r u c i a l t o Wittgenstein's 
c r i t i q u e of Gestalt psychology. Equally, though seeing-as i s involved i n 
notici n g an aspect, the difference between them i s c r u c i a l t o a coherent 
description of experiencing the Gestaltist's ambiguous schemata. And 
l a s t l y , though seeing-as i s l i k e seeing generally, i n t h a t both are 
seeing, the difference i s c r u c i a l t o a coherent description of the 
difference between perceiving representations and perceiving other 
things. Like "thinking" and "inward speech", these are a l l " d i f f e r e n t 
concepts". 1 5 
Mulhall's book i s evidently inspired by the aesthetic, or quasi-
e t h i c a l implications of the experience/interpretation d i s t i n c t i o n . 
Mulhall picks on Davidson's Truth and Int e r p r e t a t i o n as a contemporary 
statement of the position he appeals t o Wittgenstein i n order t o oppose. 
32 
Truth and In t e r p r e t a t i o n i s indeed yet another sophisticated development 
of T r a d i t i o n a l Empiricism (along Quinean l i n e s J 1 ^ But, l i k e Vesey, 
Mulhall i s going t o f i n d himself collapsing i n t o the very position he 
thinks he i s opposing. Though he acknowledges that the relevant 
categorical d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s between epistemic levels - t h a t , i n 
opposition t o Heidegger, there i s i n perception no content outside the 
epistemic net - t h i s acknowledgement seems t o flu c t u a t e i n and out of 
focus, due t o Mulhall's f a i l u r e t o preserve the categorical order of 
epistemic l e v e l s . This order depends on a l l the differences between the 
various concepts involved; the "objects" of seeing-as belong t o the 
category that representations and language belong t o , not t o the 
category of objects as such. To the extent that the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
representations and other things i s blurred, so the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the "opposing t r a d i t i o n s " i s equally blurred. Mulhall's p o s i t i o n flows 
e f f o r t l e s s l y i n t o Peacockean representationalism. 
Mulhall might w e l l have been both inspired and confused by one 
paragraph from PI i n p a r t i c u l a r , on p.212s 
"Now i t i s easy t o recognize cases i n which we are i n t e r p r e t i n g . 
When we i n t e r p r e t we form hypotheses, which may prove f a l s e . - ' I 
am seeing t h i s f i g u r e as a can be v e r i f i e d as l i t t l e as (or 
i n the same sense as) ' I am seeing b r i g h t red.' So there i s a 
s i m i l a r i t y i n the use of 'seeing' i n the two contexts." 
The s i m i l a r i t y between seeing-as and seeing, say, a colour, i s not j u s t 
t h a t neither i s a case of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; there i s a closer s i m i l a r i t y 
here than there i s between seeing-as and seeing, say, a table - f o r 
while the l a t t e r i s also not a case of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t i s v e r i f i a b l e . 
Yet there are s t i l l two uses of "see" here which, though s i m i l a r i n 
these respects, are categorically d i f f e r e n t ; colours (and shapes), 
though aspects of things rather than things, are not i n themselves 
rel a t i o n s i n the way a resemblance i s . And of course, "This object i s 
bri g h t red" i s v e r i f i a b l e i n the way that " I am seeing b r i g h t red" i s 
not. The same goes f o r "This f i g u r e looks l i k e a duck" i n r e l a t i o n t o " I 
am seeing t h i s f i g u r e as a duck". But " I am seeing a table" i s no less 
v e r i f i a b l e than "This i s a table". 
Obviously the d i s t i n c t i o n between seeing and i n t e r p r e t i n g applies 
across a l l senses of seeing; t h i s much the d i f f e r e n t uses have i n 
common, but i t does not diminish the differences between them. The 
d i s t i n c t i o n between seeing and in t e r p r e t i n g i s important t o coherent 
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descriptions of noti c i n g an aspect and seeing-as, but i t i s peripheral, 
not central - otherwise Traditional Empiricism would do j u s t as w e l l . 
T r a d itional Empiricism i s opposed t o Wittgenstein on these issues only 
because the d i s t i n c t i o n between seeing and i n t e r p r e t i n g replaces the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two senses of seeing i n the relevant context; 
and Tr a d i t i o n a l Empiricism i s opposed t o Wittgenstein on perception i n 
general only because i n t e r p r e t a t i o n displaces our usual "objects of 
sight" i n t o an unfamiliar realm of "sense-data"., 
What appeals t o Mulhall about Wittgenstein's account i s the sense 
i n which the significance of our environment i s f e l t ; i f I am "aware of 
the s p a t i a l character, the depth of an object (of t h i s cupboard f o r 
instance), the whole time I am seeing i t " , then I , "so t o speak, f e e l i t 
the whole time."17 The point of t h i s passage i s t o suggest that claims 
t o "continuous" awareness re s t on a false foundation, which i t s e l f casts 
a shadow of dubiousness over Mulhall's emphasis on "continuous aspect 
perception". But t h i s passage also indicates the v i t a l i t y of our 
relationship t o the world and t o each other. Traditional Empiricism, and 
i t s Davidsonian developments, amount t o a denial of t h i s v i t a l "ecology" 
f o r the sake of an apparent safety-net of calculated interpretation,18 
This, not only f o r Mulhall, i s a moral issue, si m i l a r t o the one that 
can be seen t o i n s p i r e , f o r example, the poetry of William Blake.19 But 
none of t h i s need involve the concept of "seeing-as", except by obvious 
implication. The d i s t i n c t i o n between seeing and i n t e r p r e t i n g does not 
need no t i c i n g an aspect or seeing-as t o show i t up, as i t i s already 
acknowledged, i n i t s own strange way, by Traditional Empiricism and i s 
presupposed i n describing the concept of noticing an aspect. However, 
seeing-as gains i t s relevance t o the issue through the concept of a 
person who i s incapable of seeing an aspect - the concept of someone who 
i s "aspect-blind" - f o r t h i s concept has much i n common w i t h the concept 
of a "Davidsonian i n t e r p r e t e r " . Both kinds of person have an i n a b i l i t y 
t o experience or " f e e l " . While the aspect-blind person i s unable t o see, 
f o r example, the i n t e n t i o n a l object represented by a p i c t u r e , without 
applying some system of inference, the Davidsonian in t e r p r e t e r i s unable 
t o make sense of human behaviour and language-use without applying a 
calculus of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - he must apply a "principle of cha r i t y " 
which reduces everything to h i s own pre-conceived standards of 
r a t i o n a l i t y . The "charity" shown here i s of a sort uncannily l i k e t h a t 
shown by a nineteenth century missionary to a culture that puzzles and 
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frightens hinu Consistent w i t h t h i s kind of i n a b i l i t y t o experience, i s 
th a t the inte r p r e t e r requires an explanation of our understanding 
language, i n order t o make sense of i t . Hence, the main purpose of Truth 
and In t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t o f i n d one. 
The s i m i l a r i t y between the concepts of "aspect-blindness" and of 
"Davidsonian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " i s further strengthened by the significance 
that Wittgenstein himself attaches to aspect-blindnessi 
"The importance of t h i s concept ["aspect-blindness"] l i e s i n the 
connexion between the concepts of 'seeing an aspect' and 
'experiencing the meaning of a word'."10 
The issue here i s c l e a r l y central t o On Being i n the World. The 
connexion does not imply, however, a connexion between "seeing an 
aspect" and "seeing generally", other than the obvious one that both are 
seeing rather than i n t e r p r e t i n g . Instead, i t implies a connexion between 
pictures and words - or more p a r t i c u l a r l y , our a t t i t u d e towards each: 
"The 'aspect-blind' w i l l have an altogether d i f f e r e n t reationship t o 
pictures from ours."** Words can be used as kinds of representation, 
which pictures are. The l a t t e r r e l y on v i s u a l resemblance, and the 
former on symbolic association. Hence, both concepts inhabit the same 
categorical l e v e l (they are both psychological concepts). The 
categorical d i s t i n c t i o n which i s so c r u c i a l throughout t h i s section of 
the Investigations i s eroded when the features which characterize 
"seeing an aspect" and "experiencing the meaning of a word" are 
a t t r i b u t e d t o "seeing generally", since then a l l concepts become 
psychological concepts. Mulhall's mistake here i s understandable i n the 
l i g h t of "experiencing the meaning of a word", due t o the deep i n t e r -
dependency between the way we experience the world and the concepts 
which inform that experience. Nevertheless, the temptation t o make t h i s 
error i s the temptation t o ignore the categorical difference between 
psychological concepts and other concepts. A l l our concepts inhabit the 
categorical l e v e l of language, obviously (concepts are not objects), but 
psychological concepts are meta-psychological, j u s t as l i n g u i s t i c 
concepts, such as " t r u t h " , " l o g i c " , "sentence" and indeed "language", 
are metalinguistic. 
To experience the meaning of a word i s t o experience something 
categorically d i s t i n c t from what i s experienced i n experiencing a state 
of a f f a i r s , even though meanings are i n t e g r a l t o the l a t t e r . The c r u c i a l 
point that Mulhall f a i l s t o appreciate, I think, i s that the two sides 
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of a categorical d i s t i n c t i o n bear a supervenient r e l a t i o n t o each other, 
whereas the r e l a t i o n between experience and concepts i s l i k e that 
between colour and shape; they l i e on the same categorical l e v e l , 
because they are mutually dependent, l i k e content and forme Equally, the 
concept of a st a r , f o r example, does not depend f o r i t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y 
on a categorical l e v e l other than that which contains stars, whereas, by 
contrast, the concept of a constellation depends on a categorical l e v e l 
other than t h a t which contains constellations - i . e . , t h a t which 
contains stars« Because Mulhall confuses the two kinds of relationship, 
h i s p o s i t i o n f a l l s away from Wittgenstein's and collapses i n t o 
Traditional Empiricism, 
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1 9 . The sense i n which t h i s v i t a l i t y i s compromised by an unwillingness 
t o take r i s k s i s captured p e r f e c t l y , I think, i n Blake's Nurses Song, 
from Songs of Experience„ The Nurse's apparent concern f o r the 
safety of the children becomes a tyranny disguising envy of the 
children's carefree a t t i t u d e she herself once possessed» 
2 0 o P I , p o 2 1 4 o 
2 1 o l b i d o 
3 Ssa^jfefiras atRT^l JSinralkB^So 
Even i f I have shown i n the previous chapter t h a t Peacocke has 
misapplied h i s notion of sensational (as opposed t o prepositional or 
conceptual) "content" t o what I called "the viewpoint-relative aspects 
of states of a f f a i r s " , the paradoxical concept of something that i s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of concepts remains, i f i t i s "sensations as 
such" that properly occupy the r o l e required by Peacocke= What remains, 
therefore, i s t o show that even "sensations as such" neither need nor 
can serve Peacocke"s requirement.. This w i l l be the aim of part 1 = 
Part I I w i l l address the more general question of how sensation 
relates t o knowledge, and w i l l s p e c i f i c a l l y be concerned w i t h 
Investigations I I , v i i i ; I hope t o be able to i n t e r p r e t Wittgenstein's 
treatment of the complex relationships between kinaesthetic awareness, 
sensations, knowledge of bodily states, experience and knowledge of 
thing outside the body, i n a way that accommodates a l l of Wittgenstein's 
comments non-counter-intuitively. I have found Stewart Candlish's 
account 1 i n s t r u c t i v e , but I have some serious c r i t i c i s m s of i t . 
I 
The concept of "sensation" i s i n t e l l i g i b l e - i t i s not the concept t h a t 
faces a d i f f i c u l t y , but our way of characterizing i t . I t i s plausible t o 
say that sensations escape the epistemic net, yet i t i s equally 
plausible t o say that no i n t e l l i g i b l e concept can escape i t . How, then, 
do we resolve t h i s apparent paradox? The solution i s of a kind already 
f a m i l i a r : sensations are not captured by concepts only i n a certain 
sense. The clue t o t h i s solution was provided, i n the context of seeing-
as, by the observation t h a t " ' I am seeing t h i s f i g u r e as...' can be 
v e r i f i e d as l i t t l e as (or i n the same sense as) ' I am seeing b r i g h t 
red 1o"2 This i s not t o say that seeing-as i s a sensation, any more 
than i t i s , or i s even i n the same category as, seeing a colour. Rather, 
there i s a relevant s i m i l a r i t y between a l l three cases; there i s a sense 
i n which none of them i s v e r i f i a b l e , and the sense i n which they are 
v e r i f i a b l e i s the same. 
I t i s of course sentences asserting or expressing seeing-as, 
seeing colours and the occurrence of sensations that are v e r i f i a b l e or 
otherwise. Such sentences can be divided i n t o two types, one of which i s 
v e r i f i a b l e and the other not. The type that i s not v e r i f i a b l e involves 
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the f i r s t - p e r s o n a l pronouns " I am seeing t h i s as a...", " I am seeing 
bri g h t red", " I am i n pain", are not v e r i f i a b l e , since no one can be i n 
a position t o disagree (assuming the use t o be sincere and 
comprehending). I n t h i s sense the concepts of "seeing-as", "seeing 
colours", and "sensations", have a non-propositional use- But t h i s does 
not a f f e c t the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the concepts, since they occur i n 
another type of sentence which i s v e r i f i a b l e . "This f i g u r e can be seen 
as a r a b b i t " , "This object i s b r i g h t red", "This person i s i n pain", a l l 
i n v i t e assent or dissent. 
Each of these concepts i s therefore similar i n that i t has two 
uses, one of which involves the fir s t - p e r s o n a l pronoun and i s non-
v e r i f i a b l e . The other ( v e r i f i a b l e ) use that each concept has, on the 
other hand, h i g h l i g h t s the differences between them. When the subject of 
the sentence involving the concept i s not oneself, i t i s i n each case of 
a d i f f e r e n t kind. I n the case of seeing-as, i t i s either a 
representation, or an object or person th a t resembles something or 
someone else. I n the case of seeing a colour, i t i s an object so 
coloured. And i n the case of a sensation, i t i s some other person or 
animal (than oneself), who behaves i n c e r t a i n recognizable ways. These 
recognizable ways of behaving provide third-personal c r i t e r i a f o r 
judgements about what sensations are a t t r i b u t a b l e t o a person i n the 
other, non-verifiable sense - the sense i n which a person experiences 
sensations f i r s t - p e r s o n a l l y . The judgement i s therefore also about what 
sensation concepts the observed person i s l i k e l y t o use i n t h i s 
expressive sense; and such use becomes a further c r i t e r i o n f o r 
third-personal a s c r i p t i o n ( i . e . , the v e r i f i a b l e use of sensation 
concepts). For example, i f someone h i t s h i s thumb while hammering i n a 
n a i l , and then holds h i s thumb under h i s arm etc. i n a manner expressive 
of pain, an observer then has c r i t e r i a f o r the judgement th a t t h i s 
person fe e l s pain i n h i s thumb. I f the observed person then says "Ow, my 
thumb!", the i n i t i a l judgement i s confirmed by t h i s verbal 
expression. More pedantically precise confirmation would be provided by 
a s t r i c t avowal, such as "My thumb hurts!". 
This posit i o n d i f f e r s from l o g i c a l behaviourism i n th a t 
behaviourism does not distinguish the two uses of sensation concepts. 
For the behaviourist, there i s no sense i n which sensation concepts are 
non-verifiable, so fir s t - p e r s o n a l use i s the same as third-personal; I 
supposedly ascribe sensations t o myself on the same grounds that anyone 
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else ascribes them t o ms. So t h i s behavioural basis does not ( f o r the 
behaviourist) provide c r i t e r i a f o r other people's judgements about what 
sensation concepts I am l i k e l y t o use i n an expressive sense. 
The ascr i p t i o n of sensations i n t h e i r v e r i f i a b l e sense i s of 
course defeasible - the behavioural c r i t e r i a do not provide necessary or 
s u f f i c i e n t conditions f o r sensations i n the non-verifiable sense 
(otherwise there wouldn't be a non-verifiable sense); but t h i s does not 
diminish the mutual dependency of the two uses f o r t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y 
and meaning. Unlike the relationship between the two senses of seeing, 
the relationship here i s not merely a supervenient one. Human behaviour 
i s not i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of the mental l i f e t hat informs i t -
the intentions t h a t motivate actions (including speech), the sensations 
and emotions that are expressed, and so on. Conversely, psychological 
concepts such as "intentions", "sensations" and "emotions" are 
i n t e l l i g i b l e only v i a human behaviour. 
As John McDowell points out3, the d e f e a s i b i l i t y of c r i t e r i a f o r 
judgements applies not only t o the behavioural c r i t e r i a f o r the 
sensations of others, but equally t o the perceptual c r i t e r i a f o r 
knowledge of states of a f f a i r s generally. I f I assert "p", and I am 
asked "how do you know that-p", I should answer, i f the basis of my 
assertion i s perceptual, that " I can see that-p". That I can see that-p 
i s my c r i t e r i o n f o r the judgement that-p, but of course t h i s does not 
mean my judgement i s necessarily true. I f i t i s f a l s e , then I could not 
have seen that-p a f t e r a l l . My assertion was motivated by the b e l i e f 
that-p, but my b e l i e f was based on a deception and turned out to be 
false. Part of McDowell's point i s also that such perceptual c r i t e r i a 
are not independently i n t e l l i g i b l e from the facts they are c r i t e r i a f o r , 
and vice-versa, despite t h e i r d e f e a s i b i l i t y . So the mutual dependency 
here i s j u s t l i k e t h a t between behavioural c r i t e r i a and sensations. 
However, I s h a l l c r i t i c i s e the quasi-explanatory r o l e t h a t McDowell 
gives t o h i s d i s j u n c t i v e account of perception, i n chapter 4. 
Before going on t o part I I , I s h a l l b r i e f l y consider how the 
preceding comments apply t o v i s u a l and auditory sensations, and how the 
concept of "pain" compares w i t h other sensation concepts. 
The concept of "pain" c l e a r l y plays a d i f f e r e n t r o l e from concepts 
such as "after-images" i n the "family" of sensation concepts. For 
example, "p a i n f u l " i s an adjective that might be used t o describe a 
t a c t i l e , auditory or vi s u a l sensation. "Pain" i s a rather general term 
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that describes many d i f f e r e n t kinds of sensation, and indicates a l e v e l 
of i n t e n s i t y rather than any pa r t i c u l a r q u a l i t y . T a c t i l e sensations 
might include itches, t i n g l e s , t i c k l e s , pressures etc., which are not 
pa i n f u l . But while a pressure, f o r example, may become p a i n f u l , itches, 
ti n g l e s and t i c k l e s do not become pai n f u l without ceasing t o be itches, 
t i n g l e s or t i c k l e s . This i s because "pressure" describes a wide range of 
i n t e n s i t i e s , while the others describe certain narrow ranges of low-
leve l i n t e n s i t y which have a pa r t i c u l a r q u a l i t y . Visual and aural 
sensations cover a wide range of i n t e n s i t i e s , l i k e pressure, but l i k e 
t i n g l e s and t i c k l e s , are characterized by q u a l i t i e s other than 
i n t e n s i t y . These q u a l i t i e s are d i f f e r e n t i n v i s u a l and aural sensations, 
however, since they are often described i n terms which would describe 
some state of a f f a i r s outside the body. This i s especially the case f o r 
after-images. While a concept l i k e "pain" i s not i n t e l l i g i b l e 
independently of the sor t of behaviour that expresses i t , the concept of 
an "after-image" i s not i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of the terms which 
would describe the ( v e r i f i a b l e ) state of a f f a i r s that the after-image i s 
an image of, or a t least that i t i s l i k e . So here again, there i s a 
sense i n which after-images are unverifiable, i n that no one can be i n 
a position t o disagree i f I say, f o r example, " I am seeing a yellow, 
box-shaped after-image". I f i t i s not of a yellow box, I describe i t as 
i f i t were. 4 But i f I drop the "as i f " and assert i n a l i t e r a l sense 
that " I am seeing an after-image of a yellow box", then I am making a 
report that i s open t o third-personal scrutiny and may be fal s e ; the 
"yellow box" may only be an int e n t i o n a l object i n a description that 
presumes i t t o be a material one.5 " i am seeing an after-image of a 
yellow box" i s v e r i f i a b l e i n the sense that " I am seeing a yellow box 
i s ; i f there i s no yellow box, then my after-image cannot be of one, any 
more than I can see one. 
I I 
The other question i s r e a l l y two questions which apply respectively t o 
d i f f e r e n t examples of sensations. After-images, f o r example, prompt us 
t o ask whether or not these are perceived. Itches and pains, on the 
other hand, i n v i t e consideration of how or i f they provide knowledge 
about our own bodies - of whether or not they are bodily perceptions. 
The body and what happens i n and t o i t i s of course a v e r i f i a b l e 
state of a f f a i r s ; t o a l i m i t e d extent, each person's relationship t o the 
d i f f e r e n t parts of h i s or her own body i s more or less the same as other 
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people's. When I look at my hand, f o r example, I know i t s shape and 
features by the same means as anyone else who might be looking over my 
shoulder. But of course my relationship t o my own hand i s also very 
d i f f e r e n t from anyone else's relationship t o i t , while being the same as 
anyone else's relati o n s h i p t o h i s or her own hand. Only I can say tha t 
t h i s hand i s a part of me; but because " t h i s " i s an indexical 
expression, every in d i v i d u a l can say the same (where " t h i s " refers t o a 
d i f f e r e n t hand i n each case, and "I" and "me" to a d i f f e r e n t 
i n d i v i d u a l ) . 
The relation s h i p that each ind i v i d u a l bears t o the various parts 
of someone else's body involves a relationship at the l e v e l of 
individuals as a whole, and so i s l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o the 
relationship between an ind i v i d u a l as a whole and the parts of his or 
her own body. But i t i s also a contingent f a c t that each i n d i v i d u a l can 
be aware of the parts of h i s or her own body by means that are not 
available i n the relationship between each ind i v i d u a l and the parts of 
other individual's bodies. Someone else may be able t o see a cut i n my 
hand, but only I can f e e l i t ( i . e . , f e e l t h i s c u t ) . 
But what part of my body am I aware of when, f o r example, I "hear" 
"whinings" and "buzzings" during a rapid change of a l t i t u d e , or when I 
experience an after-image? I t i s part of the experience th a t the former 
i s " i n my ears" and the l a t t e r i s " i n my eyes", so such experiences can 
be characterized as involving a relationship t o a person's ears or eyes 
that i s unique t o the person whose ears or eyes they are. But what 
knowledge about my ears or eyes can these experiences provide? I cannot 
hear or see any f a c t about my ears or eyes that i s comparable, f o r 
example, t o the f a c t that my hand i s cut, which I can f e e l . But there i s 
also a difference between the aural and the vi s u a l cases. After-images 
depend on a p r i o r period of ordinary v i s u a l perception, whereas such 
auditory sensations are independent of ordinary hearing. This difference 
i s r e f l e c t e d i n the f a c t that while an after-image might be described i n 
terms th a t would also describe aspects of the state of a f f a i r s i t i s an 
image of, there i s no state of a f f a i r s aspects of which could be 
described i n terms that would also describe aural sensations of the kind 
mentioned. 
I t i s plausible that a cut i n my hand i s something I come t o know 
of by means of my f e e l i n g i t ; being a v e r i f i a b l e state of a f f a i r s , i t i s 
something I can know (and be mistaken about), either by perceiving i t i n 
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a tray others might (e.g. by looking), or by "parceiving" i t i n a way 
only available to me. Is the la t t e r a genuine sense of perception? 
The fact that I can see my own foot or hand as anyone else might 
see i t means there i s no logical d i f f i c u l t y about the concept of 
perceiving a state of affairs that happens to be a part of one's own 
body» But what about cases i n which the way I "perceive" some part of me 
is available only to me? Viewpoints for objects outside the human body 
are available to everyone equally; i s viewpoint equality a logical 
condition for perception? I think not. Visually, each individual has a 
viewpoint on his or her own body that i s not available to anyone 
else. This i n fact i s a more limited viewpoint than we have of others 
( i t i s a single viewpoint a l l the time, while we have several viewpoints 
of others through time)- One cannot, for example, see the back of one's 
own head, or most of one's own face, except i n a mirror. That i s a 
limitation unique to each individual's relationship to his or her own 
body, and one that cannot be escaped from cradle to grave., Equally, what 
one can see of one's own face, e«g. one's nose, presents an aspect 
unique to that relationship. 
So there i s nothing inherently absurd about the idea of perceiving 
parts of one's body from a unique viewpoint that a person occupies a l l 
his or her l i f e , that no other person can "enter" and can only "share" 
with respect to different bodies„ And of course there i s no reason why 
that should not apply to sense modalities other than vision. Indeed, 
when i t comes to the perception of one's own body, the modality of 
feeling provides essential compensation for the limitations of 
visiono A l l that i s logically required for perception i n this respect i s 
that i t i s a verifiable state of affairs t a t a particular instance of 
sensation makes knowledge of possible. The "object" of knowledge is not 
the sensation; the sensation i s the means of knowing, e.g., that one's 
back has been lacerated. 
Aural sensations and after-images, on the other hand, are 
sensations, not verifiable states of affa i r s , so they cannot be said to 
be objects of perception. I f they are to be considered at a l l 
perceptual, they w i l l have to make knowledge of a verifiable state of 
affairs possible. The kind of aural sensations described do not. But i n 
describing an after-image, I might be describing certain aspects of 
whatever i t i s an image of. I f , for example, I have been looking out of 
a leaded window, I may well, i f I close my eyes, be l e f t with an 
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after-image describable i n terms of a pattern of diamond shapes. Even i f 
I did not know I had been looking at a leaded window, I might suddenly 
be struck by the resemblance of the after-image to a leaded window. That 
does make i t seem as i f I am able to report the presence of an after-
image, as I might report the presence of a cut i n my hando But what 
verifiable state of affairs might I report? I might report the presence 
of a leaded window, but equally I might report the presence of a pattern 
of diamond shapes, for that i s a fact about something even i f I do not 
know what i t i s a fact about= As i t happens, I would be right to 
attribute t h i s fact to a leaded window, but I might have been wrong. I f , 
on the other hand, I attribute the pattern of diamond shapes to my 
after-image, I could only be wrong i f I have misused the term "diamond-
shape" ( i . e . , i f I do not properly understand the meaning of the term, 
as i n the case of "pain"). Furthermore, when a property i s attributed to 
something, there i s the possibility of attributing other properties; the 
properties of a leaded window are not exhausted by a pattern of 
diamond-shaped colours. But i f such a property i s attributed to an 
after-image, what other properties might be attributable to i t ? In fact 
the after-image i s identical with the pattern of diamond-shaped colours, 
so i t i s inappropriate to attribute such a pattern to an after-image, as 
i f i t were a property of something not exhausted by that property. 
Rather, the after-image can be attributed to whatever i t i s an image of 
(as with a reflection or memory image). 
I can report the presence of a reflection i n a mirror or on a 
lake, and I can report the presence of an after-image " i n my 
eyes". Whatever the physical differences are, the logical difference i s 
that the after-image i s a feature of my unique viewpoint on my own body, 
whereas viewpoints on a reflection are various and universally 
available. But what i s common to both i s that the terms that would 
describe a reflection or an after-image are applicable to whatever they 
are reflections or images of, and such properties are identical with the 
reflection or the after-image, so the la t t e r cannot be the subjects of 
those properties. 
I t i s appropriate to say that we see reflections, since the 
logical requirement of a verifiable state of affairs that the relevant 
sense modality enables us know about, i s satisfied (e.g. by a reflection 
on a lake or a rainbow i n the sky). But i n the case of an after-image, 
the only verifiable state of affairs i s , say, the leaded window, not the 
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after-image, so i t i s inappropriate to say that we see the after-image„6 
In the case of itches and pains, there i s no state of affairs 
entirely outside the body the description of which can be used to 
describe the sensation,. Yet there is s t i l l a verifiable state of affairs 
the description of which can be so used, since the physical condition of 
a person's body i s a verifiable state of affairs; and this bodily state 
of affairs i s what such sensations might feasibly be thought to be 
perceptions of„ For example, one may, quite spontaneously, react to a 
severe pain i n the ankle by saying " I think I have sprained my ankle", 
or to a searing pain i n the hand by saying "I've burned my hand". In 
each case, medical evidence could (but needn't) verify or f a l s i f y one's 
i n i t i a l diagnosis., Part of such knowledge on the sufferer's part would 
undoubtedly be derived from the circumstances i n which the pain was 
occasioned - spraining one's ankle i s commensurate with stumbling i n a 
certain way, and burning one's hand with grasping something excessively 
hot. But the sensation alone might contain these epistemic elements, 
thus being a way - our primary way - of knowing something of what has 
happened to the body (or at least of knowing something i s wrong and that 
one had better find out what i t is)» Such knowledge includes the 
location of the in j u r y 0 That part of the "feel" of pains i s their 
location i n different parts of the body probably has an evolutionary 
explanation; but that i s merely an awkward way of stating the obvious -
the fact that injuries are sharply f e l t i n dominating states of 
consciousness we c a l l "pain" i s as obvious a candidate for an 
evolutionary explanation as any; i f we did not feel pain we would have 
l i t t l e chance of survival, and i f our pains did not t e l l us where our 
injuries are, they would be evolutionarily redundant. 
Any such explanation i s irrelevant to a description of the 
phenomenology of pain, but i t does support the i n t u i t i o n that i t i s the 
phenomenology that gives the meaning of the term ( i n the c r i t e r i a l l y -
dependent way indicated above), rather than the behavioural types of 
behaviourism, the causal roles of functionalism, or the brain-states of 
materialism., (When did anyone ever feel a pain i n the brain? - that i s 
physically impossible)„6 
Now I shall turn to the issue of kinaesthesia and i t s place i n I I , 
v i i i of the Investigations e Wittgenstein presents a cluster of related 
but subtly different cases to i l l u s t r a t e the same point. The f i r s t of 
these cases concerns knowledge of the position and movement of the limbs 
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i n relation to what Stewart Candlish? calls the "Doctrine of 
kinaesthesia",, The "Doctrine" i s that "My kinaesthetic sensations advise 
me of the movement and position of my limbs". In the short paragraph 
that follows, Wittgenstein observes that I can move, say, a finger and 
feel nothing or very l i t t l e , and that even when I do feel a slight 
sensation this does not "advise" me of the movement, and cannot possibly 
do so to the degree of precision with which I can describe it„ 
"Knowing" this movement, Wittgenstein says, "only means% being 
able to describe i t " . Anscombe^ evidently interprets "being able to 
describe i t " i n purely dispositional terms; that i s why Michael Martin^ 
cr i t i c i z e s her account for rendering such a b i l i t y mysterious and 
inexplicableo Wittgensteinians might c r i t i c i s e her for retreating into 
behaviourism. 
From what ground does thi s knowledge or a b i l i t y to describe 
derive? Pure dispositions do not capture the distinctive first-personal 
relationship to such knowledge; I do not "discover" how my limbs are 
moving i n the same way that other people do - i.e. by looking. So pure 
dispositions can hardly account for my a b i l i t y to know without 
looking,, The knowledge i s certainly grounded dispositionally from a 
third-personal point of view, but first-personally i t i s grounded i n the 
intentions with which I act. While dispositions are c r i t e r i a for my 
intentions, they are not identical with them, since for me my intentions 
take the form of what I am able to describe, not my manifest 
description.(I shall expand on this later.) 
But dispositions are at least commensurate with intentionality. 
Martin's response to Anscombe's account, however, i s to in s i s t that the 
relevant knowledge i s grounded experientially; this for him i s the only 
possible grounding. This also seems to be the case for Candlish - i t i s 
just that some "experiences" are not sensational. According to Candlish, 
"the deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" cannot "with the 
remotest p l a u s i b i l i t y " be thought of in terms of sensations (even i f 
"the deliverances of our eyes and ears" can) (p.23). This makes knowledge 
of the movement and position of the limbs out to be some kind of sensory 
but non-sensational experience (i . e . with genuine duration). Both Martin 
and Candlish assume that such knowledge i s to be identified with 
kinaesthetic awareness. The discord between them therefore concerns 
whether or not such "experience" or "awareness" i s sensational. Candlish 
would argue that Martin resists the introspectionism of sense-datum 
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theory by means of a "tempting" argument that preserves the assumption 
that "sensations are the only means by which we receive intimation of 
changes, whether outside of us or within our own body"» The "tempting 
argument" i s that the relevant sensations are not i n t e l l i g i b l e 
independently of what i s known (or believed). Candlish provides an apt 
example with the smell of coffee. The smell cannot be characterized 
independently of being a smell of coffee. Candlish admits that this i s 
enough to undermine the introspectionism of sense-datum theory, and 
hence of Russell's "logical construction programme", which would hold 
that the smell i s an independently i n t e l l i g i b l e "datum" that w i l l reveal 
i t s "coffeeness" only i f introspectively "read" for some indicative 
feature. The disputed assumption here i s what Candlish calls the 
"introspectionist assumption".1 shall use this as a term of convenience, 
though I do not agree with Candlish's statement of i t as being that "one 
way of finding out what the mind contains i s to introspect so that the 
relevant items become present to consciousness or attention". I should 
prefer to characterize i t as being that "our only way of knowing 
anything about ourselves or the world i s by consciously attending to the 
contents of the mind and inferring what information i t contains". The 
"tempting argument" undermines this assumption but leaves what Candlish 
calls the "empiricist assumption" untouched. This i s the assumption that 
"sensations are the only means by which we receive intimation of 
changes, whether outside of us or within our own body". 
Candlish sees the undermining of Russell's "logical construction 
programme", and hence the sense-datum theory on which i t rests, as the 
"point" of Investigations I I , v i i i . I think a reading of v i i i supports 
this view. Yet i n the next breath, so to speak, Candlish dismisses the 
"tempting argument" that achieves this as a "side-issue" compared to the 
"main point", which i s , apparently, that the "empiricist assumption" i s 
false. The f i r s t case i n v i i i does f a l s i f y this assumption, under the 
interpretation already outlined. The irony i s that Candlish's own 
argument against the "empiricist assumption" i s circular. He i s arguing 
for the conclusion that knowledge of the movement and position of the 
limbs i s not derived from sensations, but this i s complicated by his 
identification of this knowledge with "the deliverances of our 
kinaesthetic receptors", implying a state of consciousness with genuine 
duration. What he needs to show, therefore, i s that this state of 
consciousness i s not sensational. Only then can he claim kinaesthesia as 
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the best case against the "empiricist assumption". A l l Candlish can do, 
however, given his interpretation, and a l l in fact he does do, i s to 
assert that "the deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" are 
"radically different" from those of our "eyes and ears" = that even i f 
the l a t t e r can be thought of i n terms of sensations, the former "cannot 
with the remotest pl a u s i b i l i t y " be thought of i n such terms. His 
rhetorical insistence here has to make up for the fact that, given his 
identification of the relevant knowledge with kinaesthetic 
"deliverances", i t really does seem plausible to think of such knowledge 
i n terms analogous to visual or auditory experience. Candlish's 
interpretation of this knowledge hardly j u s t i f i e s the claim of a 
"radical difference". 
So Candlish has put Martin i n a favourable position, for Martin 
could r i g h t l y argue that such "deliverances" must at least be sensory, 
i f they come via our "kinaesthetic receptors". I think, however, that 
both Martin and Candlish have missed the point. 
The point i s that knowledge of the movement and position of the 
limbs i s not identified with any state of consciousness with genuine 
duration, sensational or otherwise. Rather, i t i s identified with the 
intentionality of action. I t i s our kinaesthetic awareness that has 
genuine duration, but this does not "advise me of the movement and 
position of my limbs". Moreover, i f "knowing" how my finger i s moving 
only means "being able to describe i t " , then there i s a further 
consideration that supports this interpretation and which Candlish's 
interpretation cannot accommodate. I shall dwell on this i n some det a i l . 
I am able to describe how my finger i s going to move before I move 
i t . That i s because the way I move my finger depends on how I intend to 
move i t . Consequently, my a b i l i t y to describe the movement does not 
depend on any possible kinaesthetic awareness, sensational or otherwise. 
Some kinaesthetic awareness might accompany the movement; this movement 
as a physical event i s continuous i n space and time, so the kinaesthetic 
awareness that follows i t has genuine duration, though i t might not last 
for the duration of the movement. Whether or not this awareness i s 
sensational i s therefore irrelevant to knowledge of the movement, for my 
knowledge i s independent of my kinaesthetic awareness even i f the l a t t e r 
i s not sensational. I t i s hard to see how i t is not at least sensory, 
but that i s not the point either. 
Now I shall t r y to make my interpretation somewhat clearer. 
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Suppose I close my eyes and "draw" a square i n the a i r with my 
forefinger. I already know what shape my forefinger i s going to follow 
when I move i t , because I intend i t to follow that shapeo I might 
imagine a square and "follow" i t with my finger; I am able to describe 
the movement i n the precise terms of a square-shape because that is the 
shape I intended my finger to follow before I started moving i t , and i t 
remains the shape I intend i t to follow a l l the while I am moving i t . My 
awareness of the physical movement, on the other hand, only applies 
while I am moving my finger, and even then, only when I turn my 
attention to that physical event i n space and time, as opposed to the 
imagined square. This i s my kinaesthetic awareness, which should not be 
confused with my a b i l i t y to describe the movement. 
I cannot use this awareness to "check" that my hand i s indeed 
following the intended shape, for the more my attention turns to the 
physical movement, the further i t gets from the terms with which I would 
accurately describe i t . I f I want to verify that the movement i s going 
according to my intention, I must use the same method as anyone else - I 
must looko But of course I am not driven to the need for such 
verification, even i f my awareness of the movement i s intensified by 
pain, since I do not question my inherent a b i l i t y to move according to 
my intentions. 
There are, of course, many cases i n which I would not be able to 
describe exactly how my limbs have been moving, when, for example, my 
intention has been to perform some task, rather than simply to move i n a 
certain way. I f I set out, for example, to build a wooden shed, I may 
not know half the (remarkably precise) movements I make, not due to the 
absence of kinaesthetic awareness, but to the nature of my intention. My 
a b i l i t y to act does not depend on my a b i l i t y to know or describe the 
movements involved, but the reverse dependency obtains; my knowledge of 
such movements depends on my a b i l i t y to act according to my intentions. 
So my a b i l i t y to make a l l the movements necessary to achieve a 
particular task, should not be confused with my a b i l i t y to know my 
movements, not because the la t t e r depends on a "kinaesthetic a b i l i t y " , 
but because i t depends on a specific kind of intention. 
The point Wittgenstein makes with respect to knowledge of the 
movement and position of the limbs i s illus t r a t e d by a series of 
examples of quite different kinds, indicating that this "point" applies 
equally to each example. The case of the moving finger i s followed by an 
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example involving hearing a sound, which serves to i l l u s t r a t e something 
that applies to both - namely, that "knowing" only means "being able to 
describe" (or point e t C o ) . This is embarrassing for Candlish, who claims 
that the "main point" i s the "radical difference" between the 
"deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" and those of our eyes and 
ears. Even i f Candlish had identified the real difference between 
knowledge of bodily movement and visual and aural perception, this would 
have been irrelevant to Wittgenstein's purpose, for i t i s the similarity 
that matters here, despite the difference. 
In the case of hearing a sound, I know the direction from which 
the sound comes, but "knowing" here only means "being able to to point 
or look i n the right direction", for example. The ground of my a b i l i t y 
i s different i n this case, however. I t i s not purely intentional, but 
experiential. I f I heard no sound at a l l , I could hardly t e l l where i t 
came from. The sound may "affect one ear more strongly than another" •-
that may explain my a b i l i t y to t e l l where i t comes from, but i t i s not 
part of my experience; " I don't feel this i n my ears". I hear the sound, 
and my sense of where i t comes from i s not an independent "feeling", but 
an integral part of my hearing i t . And i f , oddly, i t i s not, then I w i l l 
not "find out" by introspectively "examining" the aural "sense-
impression" for some indicative "feature". I shall have to seek out the 
source of the sound. Otherwise, whatever physical conditions are 
necessary for t h i s knowledge have their effect and " I know the direction 
from which the sound comes" - but this only means, for instance, that " I 
look i n that direction". 
And so to the t h i r d example: " I t i s the same", Wittgenstein says, 
"with the idea that i t must be some feature of our pain that advises us 
of the whereabouts of the pain i n the body"... and the fourth: "and some 
feature of our memory image that t e l l s us the time to which i t belongs." 
The same point now applies to a case i n which i t i s obvious that the 
relevant knowledge depends on feeling a sensation ( I obviously cannot 
t e l l where a pain i s i f I do not feel i t ) , and then to a case i n which, 
as with the bodily movement example, the relevant knowledge i s quite 
independent of the disputed means of knowing. The pain example parallels 
the sound example, i n that i n both cases the a b i l i t y to know is grounded 
i n sensory experience. The memory-image example, meanwhile, parallels 
the kinaesthesia example, i n that the memory-image i s irrelevant to 
knowing the time remembered, just as the kinaesthetic awareness i s 
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irrelevant to knowing the movement and position of the limbs; the 
knowledge i n these two cases i s grounded intentionally rather than 
experientiallyo But the same point applies irrespective of the 
grounding. 
By now, therefore, i t should be clear that LWs object is to 
reveal the incoherence of the "introspectionist assumption" rather than 
of the "empiricist assumption", though the latte r of course i s 
undermined i m p l i c i t l y by the intentionally grounded examples. In these 
cases, the knowledge precedes the disputed ground, thus proving that the 
disputed ground i s not the actual ground, since knowledge cannot precede 
i t s ground. In the experientially grounded cases, however, i t i s not the 
ground that i s disputed, but the independence of i t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . 
The disputed means of knowing ( i . e . "sense-impressions" or "-data") 
purportedly precedes the knowledge, whereas the actual means of knowing 
coincides with the knowledge. 
In the case of locating a pain, care should be taken to observe 
that the knowledge here concerns the location of an injury (or other 
cause), not the apparent location of the sensation, which i s not a 
question of knowledge at a l l . The point here of course i s that knowledge 
i s verifiable, and so i t must be possible for the knower to be mistaken 
( i . e . not to know). I may be mistaken about the location of an injury, 
but no one i s i n a position to confirm or deny where my pain i s f e l t . As 
I suggested near the end of part I of this chapter, the fact that the 
location of an injury usually coincides with the apparent location of a 
pain probably has an evolutionary explanation, just as the a b i l i t y to 
move according to one's intentions probably has. But the relationship of 
the explanation to the a b i l i t y has the same significance here as i t has 
in the case of locating the source of a sound - i t may or may not be the 
correct explanation, but even i f i t i s correct, i t i s not part of the 
experience (or the intention), and so i s not constitutive of the 
relevant knowledge. 
In the fourth paragraph, Wittgenstein returns to knowledge of the 
movement or position of a limb, i n a way that may i n i t i a l l y seem 
baffling. But again, thi s i s more baffling under Candlish's 
interpretation than under ours. Wittgenstein says that "A sensation can 
advise us of the movement and position of a limb." But he quickly makes 
i t clear that anyone who does not already know i s abnormal. This 
reflects the fact that our normal means of knowing here depends on our 
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a b i l i t y to move e t c according to our intentions - in other words, on 
our a b i l i t y to control our movements. A person who has no such control 
i s abnormal and then might have to rely on a special "method"., He might 
"find out" that his arm i s outstretched i f he feels a pain i n his elbow, 
for example; this would rely on the association of the pain with the arm 
being outstretched, from past experience (as well as on the normal 
a b i l i t y to locate the pain)« But this method w i l l certainly not enable 
the unfortunate person to describe his movements to the degree of 
precision with which a normal person can describe his. ( I t i s 
nevertheless one way of knowing something about oneself, so on 
Candlish's rendering of the "introspectionist assumption", Wittgenstein 
himself commits this very assumption!). 
Also i n the fourth paragraph, Wittgenstein provides an analogy for 
the memory-image case with the example of t e l l i n g the age of a 
photograph. The yellowness of a photograph might indicate that i t was 
taken rather a long time ago, because we know from past experience that 
photographs tend to go yellow with age. But what the photograph i s of is 
a much better indication of the time i t was taken. I f you took the 
photograph yourself, and the photograph i s of, say, the E i f f e l Tower, 
and the one time you visited Paris was, say, April 1985, then you can 
date the photograph down to the year and the month. You could hardly 
date i t so accurately by looking at how yellow i t i s . 
The point that Wittgenstein then goes on to make about "sense-
impressions" i s not that our knowledge of objects i s not grounded i n 
sensory experience, but that the very "concept" of "sense-impressions" 
erroneously implies that our sensory experience i s i n t e l l i g i b l e 
independently of our knowing about the world - that i t forms some kind 
of "data" o f f which we "read" what i s the case by means of certain 
"features" of i t . "What sense-impression?", Wittgenstein asks.- There i s 
simply no entity formed by our sensory experience that can be 
characterized independently of what the disputed entity i s supposed to 
"advise" us of. 
When the knowledge i s grounded experientially, the experience i s 
not i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of the knowledge, precisely because the 
knowledge i s grounded i n experience. But when the knowledge i s grounded 
intentionally, such phenomena as kinaesthetic sensations and memory-
images are i n t e l l i g i b l e independently of the knowledge, precisely 
because i t i s not grounded i n such phenomena. But I do not "read" either 
5 3 
my experience or my intentions l i k e a book; they do not " t e l l " me 
anything, for i t i s i n one or the other that I already know,, 
l o "Proprioceptive A b i l i t y and Kinaesthetic S e n s a t i o n s " . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
2 . Philosophical Investigations, p g . 2 1 2 „ 
3 o "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge". 
4. "What i f I'm asked to draw the after-image and my drawing isn't box-
shaped?"- Then either I have misdescribed the shape or misdrawn i t . 
(An after-image i s not l i k e a memory-image). My point here concerns 
what the after-image looks as i f i t could be an image of, not what i t 
necessarily i s an image of; i t i s only the shape that matters. I f I 
were looking at the corner of a box and saw a pyramidal shape, my 
after-image would be pyramidal shaped - I would be misrepresenting i t 
i f I described i t as box-shaped, or drew a box shape. 
5 . G.E.M.Anscombe i n "The Intentionality of Sensation" (Collected 
Philosophical Papers, v o l . 1 1 ) , draws the useful distinction between 
"material" and "intentional" objects. 
6 . "The patient did not feel pain i n his grey-matter." 
7 . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
8 . Intention ( 1 9 5 7 ) and On Sensations of Position ( 1 9 6 2 ) . 
9 . "Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties" (ch.8 of Spatial 
Representation, ed. Eilan). 
Chapter 3 , Notes. 
41 UsgiggtsESB ?smrg1 EsMceffo 
The subject of this chapter i s the relationship between experience and 
belief„ In part 1 I shall describe an imaginary scenario from which 
certain implications can be derived =, These w i l l undermine Armstrong's 
view that perceptions are necessarily belief-states; but more 
significantly they w i l l form the basis for criticisms of Quine's 
analysis of the role of inference and theory i n experience, and i n part 
2, of the quasi-explanatory character of McDowell's disjunctive account 
of perception 
I 
Suppose we lived i n a world where there was no such thing as a 
green pane of glass, i n much the same way that we do actually l i v e i n a 
world, or so we believe, where there is no such thing as a unicorn. And 
then, one day, someone - "A" - sees a green pane of glass; or at least 
that i s how i t seems to A - that what he sees before him i s a green pane 
of glass. He can see that i t i s , say, about four feet square. He walks 
around i t . I t shows the same emerald shade of green from the other side. 
He touches i t s surface to make sure i t i s not a hologram. He even 
carries out a scratch-test to make sure i t i s glass and not some other 
material. There i s nothing A can do to prove i t i s not, after a l l , a 
green pane of glass. Yet s t i l l , such i s A's f a i t h i n the science of his 
world, he does not believe that what he sees before him i s really a 
green pane of glass. There must, A thinks, be some explanation for his 
seeing this object - "x" - as a green pane of glass, other than that x 
is a green pane of glass.2 But i n the absence of any actual explanation, 
A i s , to say the least, puzzled by this paradoxical state 
of affairs. 
Next day, A describes his puzzling experience to B. B laughs and 
says; " I know what you saw, because I saw the same thing myself and 
decided to investigate the cause of this phenomenon; i n fact there were 
two panes of glass, one blue and one yellow, making congruent surface 
contact." A has to think about this for a moment. Not being familiar 
with colour theory, A reasons that i f there were two congruently 
superimposed panes of glass, one blue and one yellow, then i t i s 
probable that blue and yellow make green, since that would explain the 
fact that he saw the blue and yellow panes as a single green pane. I t 
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now seems to A highly unlikely that this hypothesis i s false, since i t 
accounts for the facts entirely and without anomaly,, A l l A needs to do 
now i s to check that blue and yellow do make green, and then, with a 
positive result, he w i l l be satisfied that a highly plausible answer has 
been found to the apparent paradox of seeing x as something known, or at 
least believed, not to exist.3 
Wow l e t us suppose that A takes his reasoning a stage further. On 
the basis of the kind of inference involved i n arriving at an 
explanation of what A saw x as, A reasons that his seeing x as a green 
pane of glass involved a similar kind of inference, only a mistaken, 
invalid or false one. That i s to say, A now thinks that when he saw x as 
a green pane of glass, instead of inferring correctly that x was a 
congruent superimposition of two panes of glass, one blue and the other 
yellow, he inferred incorrectly that x was a green pane of glass. 
However, i t i s obvious that A's further reasoning cannot be ri g h t , 
since A only saw x as a green pane of glass; he never once believed that 
i t was a green pane of glass. A i s misrepresenting the original 
experience i n claiming that any such inference was involved, because no 
such belief was involved. The accusation that A i s misrepresenting his 
own past experience assumes, of course, that inference from a set of 
premises that are believed to a conclusion necessarily entails belief i n 
the conclusion. But I think i t i s d i f f i c u l t to argue against this i f we 
are considering conscious inference or reasoning rather than mere 
mechanical calculation. A,s newly acquired belief that such an inference 
and therefore, i m p l i c i t l y , such a belief, was involved i n his seeing x 
as a green pane of glass i s a false belief about his own past 
experience. 
The true situation might be summed up by saying, l ) a t time t l , A's 
conception of x was that of a green pane of glass; 2)at t l , A did not 
believe that x was a green pane of glass; 3)A's conception of x at t l 
was explained at t2 by the fact that x was a congruent superimposition 
of two panes of glass, one blue and one yellow; 4)at t l , A did not 
believe that x was such as the explanation at t2 described i t . 
These four propositions, i f i t i s even possible that they could be 
true, rule out the possibility that the formation of a conception or 
concept necessarily involves a belief. I t follows from t h i s that, i f 
inference and interpretation necessarily involve belief, then the 
formation of a concept does not necessarily involve inference or 
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interpretation. Hence, i f the conditionals are satisfied here, then 
since A's conception of x did not involve a belief, i t could not have 
formed through inference or interpretation. I take i t that the relevant 
conditionals are satisfied. 
I shall now apply this conclusion to a certain position held by 
Quine (1981). Quine says (p.20) that "The scientific system, ontology 
and a l l , i s a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory 
stimulation to sensory stimulation." From the general context, i t does 
not appear that this i s a "bridge" that links sensory stimuli to sensory 
stimuli i n any straightforward or immediate sense, for Quine states i n 
the previous paragraph that "Whether we encounter the same apple the 
next time around, or only another one l i k e i t , i s settled i f at a l l by 
inference from a network of hypotheses that we have internalised l i t t l e 
by l i t t l e i n the course of acquiring the non-observational 
superstructure of our language." For Wittgenstein, i t i s doubtful even 
i f the "aspect-blind" have to resort to this kind of strategy (cf.R.P.P. 
p.899). 
Quine i s right to say that concepts li n k sensory stimuli. For 
example, without the concept of identity persisting through time, we 
would never tend i n our visual perception to identify a particular apple 
(or person) as being the same as the one seen yesterday i n the same (or 
a different) place. Recognition implies this concept, such that the 
concept of any particular object, animal or person, be that a nameless 
apple, "Fido" or a close relative, must include some conception of 
identity through time i n the absence of observation, i n order to include 
the possibility of recognition on another occasion. But Quine makes the 
further assumption that for observation-independent identity to come to 
form an integral aspect of the conception of a particular, such that 
recognition becomes possible, necessarily involves the same kind of 
reasoning that would be involved i n explaining how such a conception 
might have been formed - i.e., i n terms of "inference from a network of 
hypotheses", or i n other words, i n terms of a theory. For example, the 
hypothesis that apples have a relatively stable molecular structure that 
keeps their form, size and colour patterning more or less constant over 
periods of, say, a few weeks, explains, i f true, l)why the apple has a 
similar appearance from one day to the next, and 2)why such a similar 
appearance provides grounds for assuming (believing) identity. I f th i s 
kind of reasoning were involved i n recognising a particular apple next 
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time around, our recognition would necessarily entail the belief that 
this i s the same apple. 
Prima Facie, t h i s may seem plausible. Surely one does not 
recognize something without believing i t to be the same thing as seen 
previously? However, for one thing, this does not account for our 
a b i l i t y to recognize someone or something in a photograph or drawing. 
Neither does this account for two other aspects of our experience of 
recognition with respect to belief. F i r s t l y , i t does not account for, as 
sometimes happens, the recognition of something or someone one does not 
believe one has seen before. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, i t 
does not account for the fact that one may correctly identify a thing or 
person by expressing one's sense of recognition, without believing i t to 
be the same thing or person. For example, suppose someone fakes his own 
funeral so that a l l his family believe he i s dead. Then one day he i s 
recognized i n the street by his son. The son i s startled by this 
recognition, but he does not believe i t i s his father, even though i t i s 
his father. As i n the case of seeing something as a green pane of glass, 
there i s no belief that what x i s seen as i s what x actually i s . 
The difference i n the two cases i s that while i n one case any such 
belief would be false (in the circumstances), i n the other case any such 
belief would be true. 
What Quine's "bridge" of theory settles i s whether or not one 
believes, ultimately, that x is the same thing next time around, not 
whether or not one recognizes i t . I t may be objected here that this i s 
precisely Quine's point; he i s not talking about recognition at a l l , but 
about what settles our belief. But that only goes against Quine's idea 
that the formation of the concept of identity requires inference from a 
set of hypotheses, since this concept i s entailed i n recognition, and 
recognition does not entail belief (whereas inference does). 
Science and religion have this much i n common: they t r y to settle 
our beliefs about the world. Quine's chief concern is with establishing 
a language - an edifice of sentences - compatible with the demands of 
science; consequently he is concerned with what establishes belief, and 
in particular, true belief. But what establishes belief i s not 
necessarily what establishes conception. A r t i s t i c conception, 
paradigmatically, may involve no belief at a l l - that i s , no belief 
concerning the content of the art. A r t i s t i c conception exemplifies the 
point that the concept of identity that i s inherent i n our capacity for 
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recognition does not involve the kind of inference that would settle and 
explain a conflict of beliefs. 
Another source of confusion i n th i s matter l i e s i n insufficient 
attention to the distinction between particulars and universals. 
Encountering the "same apple next time around" and recognizing i t i s to 
encounter and recognize the same particular apple. But this may be 
confused with our recognition of the fact that this particular thing i s 
an apple, which i s a matter of classification. Classification 
"transcends the "Fido'-Fido principle"; but we need not have transcended 
this principle i n order to recognize the same thing (which happens to be 
an apple) next time around (and therefore exhibit the presence of the 
concept of identity through time i n one's experience). One may well 
recognize the same thing without having the slightest idea how to 
classify i t . I t i s conceivable that an isolated tribe i n New Guinea 
might recognize the sun each day (have a conception of the sun as one 
and the same object that rises each morning), without realising that i t 
i s a star ( i t may be considered unique, l i k e the sky). Identification of 
particulars does not presuppose classification. You identify a class, 
not a particular, when you say "this i s a dog" (what you do with the 
particular here i s to classify i t ) . 
One can concede to Quine that as far as classification i s 
concerned, theory can play a v i t a l role. Yet even here there i s a level 
at which similarity i s recognized i n the same way that identity i s . I t 
i s just that such immediate recognition of similarity i s not enough for 
a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y adequate system of classification. A giant panda, for 
example, looks more l i k e a bear than a red panda, while a red panda 
looks more l i k e a raccoon than a giant panda. But the biologists 
classify giant and red pandas together as pandas, not separately as 
bears and raccoons. In other words, our visual capacity for recognition 
of identity and similarity i s not sufficient for science, which requires 
inference and theory for satisfactory classification. The theory that 
apples grow on trees would rule out anything that looked (and even 
tasted) just l i k e an apple but did not grow on trees, from being classed 
as an apple. But greengrocers might abandon this theory for purposes of 
trade. So we could classify things purely according to visual (and/or 
gustatory) similarity i f we so chose, which then would not involve 
inference and theory. Indeed, theories such as that apples grow on trees 
presuppose i n their very terms a conception of identity persisting 
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through timso So the position of Quine's t h e o r e t i c a l "bridge", which 
places a need f o r hypothesis and inference (and hence b e l i e f ) before we 
can go on t o have a conception of "sameness" (or indeed a b e l i e f i n 
i d e n t i t y ) , generates an i n f i n i t e regress of theory, conception and 
b e l i e f o According t o Quine, we need a b e l i e f i n i d e n t i t y before we can 
have a b e l i e f i n i d e n t i t y . 
A s i m i l a r point can be made with respect t o b e l i e f i t s e l f ; surely 
b e l i e f one way or the other concerning i d e n t i t y i s normally se t t l e d j u s t 
by simple recognition or seeing - one believes t h a t what seems t o see i s 
what x i s 4 , unless there i s a reason f o r not believing t h i s ; e.g., some 
previous b e l i e f w i t h which any such new b e l i e f would be incompatible ( i f 
A had not believed that green panes of glass did not e x i s t , A would have 
believed t h a t x was a green pane of glass). I t i s j u s t t h a t , as t h i s 
example shows, such recognition on i t s own i s not adequate f o r 
s c i e n t i f i c purposes. But even i f Quine's own terms are accepted - that 
i t i s occasion-sentences reporting sensory s t i m u l i that u l t i m a t e l y 
decide our acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of a theory, then simple recognition 
i s i n the end our only means of s e t t l i n g our b e l i e f s about about the 
world; and no amount of theory can a l t e r that s i t u a t i o n . 
I I 
I s h a l l now consider ways i n which consideration of the r o l e of 
b e l i e f i n experience can lead t o confusion i n respects t h a t are 
diametrically opposed, so t o speak, t o those I have l e v e l l e d against 
Quine. This second so r t of mistake i s due t o a reluctance t o accept t h a t 
i n f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s play a r o l e i n the concept of perception at any 
l e v e l , motivated by the f a c t t h a t causal reasoning seems t o 
generate philosophical problems such as the argument from i l l u s i o n 
(which, as I hope I have shown i n chapter 1, i t needn't). Whereas the 
f i r s t s ort of mistake extended inference and theory t o a point at which 
an i n f i n i t e regress of theory and conception becomes in e v i t a b l e , the 
second sort of mistake extends the kind of conception t h a t does not 
require inference and theory t o a point at which the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
explanation w i t h respect t o experience and knowledge i s defeated. 
Anscombe and McDowell, I thi n k , both make t h i s second kind of mistake. 
I n Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties, Michael Martin 
c r i t i c i s e s G.E.M.Anscombe on the subject of kinaesthesia. Anscombe's 
position i s that awareness of the position of limbs or the location of 
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i n j u r i e s i s something quite independent of sensations - th a t sensations 
are "purely subjective" i n neither containing any such objective 
awareness i n t r i n s i c a l l y , nor causing such awareness e x t r i n s i c a l l y o I n 
chapter 3 I suggested that while Martin's c r i t i c i s m i s r i g h t i n so f a r 
as Anscombe's account f a i l s t o f i n d a ground f o r such knowledge, he i s 
wrong i n h i s construal of the necessary ground as being sensational as 
opposed t o being purely i n t e n t i o n a l . While i t may w e l l be d i f f i c u l t t o 
make sense of the concept of kinaesthetic awareness other than i n 
Martin's terms of "impure sensations", i t i s not kinaesthetic awareness 
that grounds knowledge of the movement and positi o n of the limbs, but 
the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y of action. In the case of knowledge of the location 
of an i n j u r y , on the other hand, Martin's point applies without 
reservation, since the ground i s obviously sensational. I t i s here th a t 
the internalism of knowledge t o sensation i s commensurate w i t h 
Wittgenstein, since t h i s s t i l l opposes the putative independent 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of "sense-data" •» A Wittgensteinian objection t o 
Anscombe"S account i s that i t collapses i n t o behaviourism,, 
Anscombe's di s p o s i t i o n a l account of the relevant knowledge denies 
any ground f o r which dispositions t o behave i n x-ways form mere t h i r d -
personal c r i t e r i a o Martin observes t h a t , "Anscombe suggested that there 
i s simply 'knowledge without observation' of the position of one's 
limbs; and instead of a f e l t location f o r sensations, there i s simply a 
disposition t o act towards whichever part of one's body i n which the 
sensation i s said t o be located." His objection should not be that 
observation i s r e a l l y involved i n both cases, but that Anscombe denies 
any ground, observational or otherwise, f o r either case, and that 
although the ground i s d i f f e r e n t i n each case, there i s a ground of some 
kind i n both cases, f o r which dispositions t o act are c r i t e r i a . 
Anscombe does therefore admit, r i g h t l y , that the position of one's limbs 
i s known; she i s also r i g h t t o avoid saying that the location of 
sensations i s known. But she also avoids saying what i s known here ( i . e . 
the location of the cause of the sensation). Once we admit that 
something i s known i n both cases, we can see that they face the same 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Anscombe's account. The conclusion that the location of 
an i n j u r y i s not f e l t simply goes against our subjective experience, 
while i n both cases the lack of a ground poses d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r 
explanation. When a person declares something to be the case, only i f 
h i s or her means of knowing i s a puzzle i s i t pertinent t o ask how he or 
she knows. I f someone says, f o r example, "there i s a c o l l e c t i o n of 
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r i f l e s i n t h a t house", i t might be pertinent t o ask "how do you know?"; 
and the answer might be " I went i n there and saw them"„ His seeing the 
r i f l e s explains h i s knowledge. I n normal circumstances no such 
explanation i s required, since i t i s obvious how people know, f o r 
example, what was on the t e l e v i s i o n l a s t night• The same applies, t o an 
even greater extent, f o r our knowledge of the location of i n j u r i e s . I f 
someone exclaims "My ankle hurts!", no sane human being would bother t o 
ask, "how do you know i t ' s your ankle that hurts?". We would not ask 
t h i s , not because i t i s u t t e r l y mysterious how the sufferer knows i t i s 
h i s ankle there i s something the matter with, but because i t i s 
absolutely obvious how he knows - he can f e e l i t ! I f he claimed to f e e l 
nothing, then such a question would be pertinent. The p e c u l i a r i t y of the 
circumstances here would be p a r a l l e l l e d i n ordinary v i s u a l perception 
only by such unusual phenomena as "blind-sight". I t does become 
something of a mystery as t o how the blind-sighted i n d i v i d u a l can know 
what he does about h i s environment, since he claims not t o be able t o 
see it« What i s unfortunate about Anscombe1s account i s t h a t , as i n the 
strange case of bl i n d - s i g h t , i t compels us t o ask how we know the 
location of our i n j u r i e s or the positio n of our limbs, because i t 
eliminates what we took t o be the obvious answerso So now we require an 
explanation where i t never occurred t o us that one was needed. Yet no 
explanation i s possible, since i t i s blocked by that which displaced 
what we took f o r an explanation - namely, by dispositions and knowledge 
without any ground whatsoever. These, then, ought t o provide the 
explanatory power tha t sensations or intentions, according t o Anscombe, 
do not; but they themselves motivate the requirement f o r an explanation 
i n the f i r s t place. 
McDowell's account of perception^ leaves us equally mystified and 
compelled t o seek an explanation where i t would otherwise never have 
occurred t o us th a t one was needed. Of course i t i s true t h a t f o r every 
experience t h a t seems v e r i d i c a l , either i t i s v e r i d i c a l or i t i s n ' t ; but 
t h i s d i s j u n c t i v e f a c t cannot, as McDowell t r i e s t o make i t do, replace 
the causal (external) r e l a t i o n between the seeing of an object and the 
object seen (when i t jts seen), which both explains the experience and 
describes the difference between v e r i d i c a l perception and cases of 
i l l u s i o n . I n the case of bodily perception, we were not forced t o deny 
a causal r e l a t i o n between an i n j u r y and the f e e l i n g of i t , l ocation and 
a l l , i n order t o accommodate Martin's (and Wittgenstein's) internalism. 
That i s t o say, the r e l a t i o n i s i n t e r n a l on one l e v e l and external on 
62 
anothero 
This applies equally t o the r e l a t i o n between the seeing of an 
object and the object seen,, The r e l a t i o n here i s external i n the sense 
that the object of perception i s material ( t o use toscombe's 
d i s t i n c t i o n ) . I n each case, either the i n t e n t i o n a l object i s also a 
material one, or i t i s n ' t . This i s the disjunctive f a c t about 
experience, but t h i s f a c t i s not properly understood i f i t motivates the 
denial of the e x t e r n a l i t y of the relationship between the material 
object and the i n t e n t i o n a l one. For then the difference between the two 
sides of the disjunct can neither be described nor explained. From the 
"inside", a f t e r a l l , the difference may be indiscernibleo Then the 
difference i s i n t e l l i g i b l e , and describable, only from an "outside" 
point of view, which shows an external r e l a t i o n between the percipient 
and whatever he either sees or mistakes f o r something else. 
I t i s i n t u i t i v e t o suggest that i n cases of v e r i d i c a l perception, 
what one seems t o see i s " r e a l l y " there, materially. This serves not 
only t o describe the s i t u a t i o n , but also t o explain i t . With t h i s 
obvious explanation eliminated, we are compelled t o seek another= Yet 
a l l explanatory power i s blocked by the extension of the i n t e r n a l 
r e l a t i o n s on both sides of the disj u n c t , t o replace the external 
r e l a t i o n additional on one of them-
While material objects are i n t e l l i g i b l e t o us only i n the sense 
that they are also i n t e n t i o n a l objects, the difference between 
v e r i d i c a l and non-veridical experience i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n the sense 
that i n t e n t i o n a l objects are, i n cases of v e r i d i c a l perception, also 
material ones; t h i s i n t u r n i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n terms of an external 
relationship i n addition t o the i n t e r n a l ones of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . This 
e x t e r n a l i t y provides the sense i n which v e r i d i c a l perception i s , at the 
simplest l e v e l , explained. 
McDowell's account does not solve any philosophical problems; i t 
merely t r i e s t o a l t e r the nature of the problem* The problem i s no 
longer philosophical, apparently, but explanatory. Yet i t i s 
philosophical, since no explanation i s possible. To make the problem an 
explanatory one, i t must be shown that an explanation i s possible; 
McDowell attempts t o do t h i s by t a l k i n g of the world "getting inside" 
the head. He thus forces the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s which alone he w i l l 
allow, i n t o a quasi-explanatory r o l e which only an external r e l a t i o n can 
f i l l . The r e s u l t i s a collapse i n t o idealism. 
Chapter 4, Notes. 
1. " C r i t e r i a , D e f e a s i b i l i t y and Knowledge". 
2. Perhaps t h i s w i l l seem a non-Wittgensteinian use of "seeing-as", but 
I t h i n k t h i s use i s consistent with the account of seeing-as i n 
chapter 2. I t would be seeing-as i n the Peacockean sense i f A took x 
to be a green pain of glass, but he manifestly does not. A i s struck 
by the f a c t t h a t x resembles a green pane of glass t o the extent of 
looking exactly l i k e one. The one d i f f i c u l t y i s that A could never 
have seen any green pane of glass that i t might resemble; but then we 
recognize unicorns i n pictures without ever having seen a unicorn. 
3. We assume here th a t i n t h i s world the production of green panes of 
glass i s considered physically impossible. 
4. And then i t i s not a case of seeing-as. 
5 S^ssspiifeitsai affiyfl Id^&ifcjfo 
I n part 1 of chapter 4 I suggested, i n opposition t o Quine 1,that what 
normally "decides" whether or not something (e.g.. an apple), seen once 
before, i s the same thing "next time around", i s not a set of 
hypotheses, but simple recognition, or non-recognition as the case may 
be. There must, a f t e r a l l , be some way of deciding whether or not t o 
believe such hypotheses t o be true - obviously something other than the 
hypotheses themselves„ Furthermore, i f we do recognize an apple or a 
face, then i t i s the same apple or face we saw before; so recognition 
does not merely decide whether or not we believe i t t o be the sameo 
But of course we can be mistaken as t o whether or not we recognize 
the apple or the face, j u s t as we may be mistaken as t o whether or not 
we remember c e r t a i n events. I f we do remember them, then those events 
did occur. Memory and recognition, unlike thought, b e l i e f or sensation, 
are open t o second- or third-personal scrutiny; someone may t e l l me tha t 
I could not possibly have remembered or recognized such-and-such, and be 
r i g h t , however convinced I am. I n such cases the pertinent decision i s 
whether or not the apple or the face has been recognized, rather than 
whether or not i t i s the same. For the question of i t s being the same i s 
fatuous unless related t o p a r t i c u l a r circumstances i n which i t might or 
might not have occurred before - such as i t s having been seen or not 
seen by a ce r t a i n person on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion„ The apple i s 
obviously the same as i t s e l f through time (time i s i n t e g r a l with i t s 
existence, f o r nothing exists independently of time); t h a t i s simply not 
an issue. 
Just as the t r u t h of a hypothesis i s s e t t l e d by factors other than 
the hypothesis i t s e l f , so the question of recognition must equally be 
set t l e d by factors other than claims t o recognition. For example, i f 
someone v i s i t s an ex h i b i t i o n and claims t o recognize an o r i g i n a l 
painting t h a t has been displayed f o r the f i r s t time, then the t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y of a l l the hypotheses concerning the origins of the painting 
w i l l decide whether or not the claim t o recognition can possibly be 
true. I f i t turns out, say, that i t i s the v i s i t o r who painted the 
picture and not the exhibitor who claims t o have painted i t , then there 
i s every reason t o believe the v i s i t o r when he says he recognizes the 
painting. Otherwise, he i s simply mistaken. 
But what i f the painting i s a copy? Even i f the painting i s only 
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vaguely si m i l a r t o another that the v i s i t o r has seen before, i s there 
not some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s claim t o recognize i t ? There i s an 
important difference between recognition and not i c i n g a resemblance, as 
well as important s i m i l a r i t i e s . That i s not t o say, however, that a 
painting i s not recognized when i t i s only a copy that i s seen second 
time around, even i f the copy only vaguely resembles the o r i g i n a l . The 
purpose of t h i s chapter w i l l be t o explore the s i m i l a r i t i e s and the 
differences between recognition and noticing a resemblance, the l a t t e r 
being the subject of chapter 2 under the label "noticing an aspect". 
The main s i m i l a r i t y between the two concepts i s t h a t both are 
kinds of noti c i n g . The important difference i s that while noticing a 
resemblance involves two d i f f e r e n t things, or even two d i f f e r e n t kinds 
of t h i n g , and i s the very source of concept formation (the generation of 
universals), recognition, by contrast, i s r e s t r i c t e d t o what Quine 
humorously c a l l s the "'Fido'- Fido" p r i n c i p l e ^ , involving one and the 
same thin g only. Recognition therefore i m p l i c i t l y concerns i d e n t i t y , 
while not i c i n g a resemblance i m p l i c i t l y concerns class or kind. There 
are many ways i n which i d e n t i t y and kind tend t o be confused; by 
exploring the differences between recognition and not i c i n g a 
resemblance, some of these confusions w i l l be unravelled, while the 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between them w i l l help t o explain why such confusions tend 
t o occur. 
Let us then r e t u r n t o the question of recognizing a painting when 
viewing a mere copy. I f the observer notices a vague resemblance, or 
even a s t r i k i n g one, t o some other painting he has seen before, t h i s 
does not constitute recognition, though the observer may w e l l mistake 
the sense of f a m i l i a r i t y f o r recognition; he may say, q u i z z i c a l l y , "I'm 
sure I've seen that picture before", or "I'm sure I recognize that 
p i c t u r e " , f o r g e t t i n g what i t was exactly he had seen before that 
resembles i t . According t o the stated c r i t e r i o n , the reason t h i s i s not 
a case of recognition i s th a t i t involves more than one thing - i t i s a 
case of notic i n g a resemblance. But now suppose the painting i s a copy, 
or i t i s not a painting but a p r i n t , of an o r i g i n a l the observer has 
seen before. This equally involves two things, and i f i t involves two 
things i n the same way, or on the same l e v e l , then the s i t u a t i o n should 
not seem any closer t o being a case of recognition, however close the 
resemblance. Yet i t does seem closer, and not j u s t because of the degree 
of resemblance. 
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Three p o s s i b i l i t i e s present themselvess l,the stated c r i t e r i o n i s 
false; 2,the sense of being closer t o recognition spells confusion; 
3,the two things involved here are not involved i n the way they are i n a 
case of not i c i n g a resemblance., I think the t h i r d of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
i s true. I am not necessarily mistaken i f when I see, f o r example, a 
p r i n t or photograph of Wyndham Lewis's p o r t r a i t of T.S.Eliot, I say tha t 
I recognize W.L.'s painting, whether i t was the o r i g i n a l I saw before or 
I have only ever seen other copies of i t and have never seen t h i s copy 
of i t beforeo The question hinges on whether or not the picture I see i s 
i n f a c t a copy. A simi l a r c r i t e r i o n applies when, seeing W.L.'s 
p o r t r a i t , I claim t o recognize Eliot«3 I am not mistaken j u s t because 
the painting i s not, l i t e r a l l y , T.S.Eliot, or because I have only ever 
seen E l i o t i n pictures and have never seen t h i s picture of him before, 
what matters i s that the painting i s i n f a c t a p o r t r a i t of T.S.Eliot. I n 
t h i s case my recognition depends on the i n t e n t i o n of the painter. I 
think i n t e n t i o n a l i t y also has a ro l e t o play concerning i d e n t i t y i n 
certain cases, but I s h a l l discuss t h a t l a t e r . 
The concept of recognizing someone i n a picture c l e a r l y faces the 
same d i f f i c u l t y as the concept of recognizing a painting i f i t i s a copy 
I see now and the o r i g i n a l I saw before, or i t i s only copies I have 
ever seen. How i s e i t h e r case possible, given the stated c r i t e r i o n f o r 
recognition? I t i s necessary t o show how the two things involved i n each 
case are not involved i n the way that they are i n cases of notic i n g a 
resemblance. 
When I recognize a person i n a p o r t r a i t , I do not merely wish t o 
say that the person depicted looks l i k e so-and-so. I want t o say i t i s 
so-and-so. The person depicted i s one and the same as the person 
depicted i n other pictures I have seen of him or her, and tha t i s not 
affected by the f a c t t h a t a l l these pictures are d i f f e r e n t . I f i t i s the 
same person depicted i n a l l these d i f f e r e n t pictures, then I am r i g h t t o 
claim that I recognize that person, even though I have never seen him at 
f i r s t hand, so t o speak, and have never seen t h i s p a r t i c u l a r picture of 
him before. For i t i s not the picture I claim t o recognize, but the 
person depicted; and because i t i s the same person i n a l l the d i f f e r e n t 
pictures, and the same person whether depicted or seen at f i r s t hand, 
the f a c t that i t i s only through having seen a d i f f e r e n t picture that I 
now recognize him i n t h i s one i s i r r e l e v a n t . The relevant point i s t h a t 
the d i f f e r e n t pictures are of one and the same person, and my claim t o 
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recognition concerns the person these are pictures of, rather than the 
pictures. The pictures are my means of recognition, not what I 
recognize. So on the l e v e l of what I recognize, only one individual i s 
involved; whereas, i n the case of noticing a resemblance, there are two 
things involved on the l e v e l of what i s seen t o resemble what, and that 
i s the c r u c i a l difference. 
Let us say that the f i r s t time I saw Wyndham Lewis's p o r t r a i t of 
T.S.Eliot, I was at a ga l l e r y and i t was the o r i g i n a l I saw. I had seen 
photographs of E l i o t before, so I recognized E l i o t immediately, before I 
had the chance t o read who i n f a c t i t was a p o r t r a i t of. I n confirming 
t h i s t o be the case by reading the t i t l e on the w a l l , I confirm that I 
did recognize E l i o t , and did not merely notice a resemblance. Whether or 
not that confirmation i s forthcoming w i l l therefore depend on the 
inte n t i o n of the a r t i s t . I t w i l l not depend on whether or not, i n 
choosing E l i o t as h i s subject, the painter intended the painting t o 
represent E l i o t i n p a r t i c u l a r rather than some abstract idea; neither 
w i l l i t depend on whether or not E l i o t was present when W.L. painted the 
picture. Rather, i t w i l l depend on whether or not the painter referred 
to E l i o t i n producing the picture; on whether or not i t was E l i o t ' s 
features that informed the painter's choice of l i n e and shape, from l i f e 
or from sketches or from mere memory. The a r t i s t might even have used 
someone else as a model, but provided h i s decisions were modified by 
constant reference t o E l i o t as he remembered him, then the picture i s of 
E l i o t , even i f the a r t i s t decides i t i s not "about" E l i o t s p e c i f i c a l l y , 
but, say, c i v i l i z e d man i n general. 
Having established that the p o r t r a i t i s of T.S.Eliot and that when 
I saw i t f o r the f i r s t time I recognized E l i o t , suppose then at some 
l a t e r date I see a photograph of t h i s very p o r t r a i t on the cover of a 
biography by Peter Ackroyd. I not only recognize T.S.Eliot once again, 
but Wyndham Lewis's p o r t r a i t ( I recognize the l a t t e r f o r the f i r s t time, 
fo r i t i s only the second time I have seen i t either at f i r s t hand or i n 
a copy) - before having the chance t o check th a t i t i s indeed a 
photograph of W.L.'s p o r t r a i t . Of course the photograph on the cover of 
the book i s not W.L.'s painting any more than W.L.'s painting i s T.S. 
E l i o t . But the photograph i s of W.L.'s painting, j u s t as the painting i s 
of T.S.Eliot. The reference of the photograph t o the painting need not 
be i n t e n t i o n a l as the reference of the painting t o T.S.Eliot was, since 
i t i s not necessarily an act that i s affected by the subject; the 
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photograph could have captured the painting quite accidentally, and that 
does not a f f e c t my recognition. What matters i n t h i s case i s that i t was 
W.L.'s p o r t r a i t that affected the l i g h t that f a l l s onto the photographic 
plate or f i l m . So, even though my means of recognition involves two 
d i f f e r e n t things, what I claim t o recognize i s indeed one and the same 
thing, namely Wyndham Lewis's p o r t r a i t of T.S.Eliot, and that i s enough 
to validate my claim. 
Nothing i s altered i f the reverse obtains - i f i t was the 
photograph on the cover of Ackroyd's biography I saw f i r s t , and the 
o r i g i n a l painting i n the g a l l e r y l a t e r ; neither i s my claim t o 
recognition invalidated i f I never saw the o r i g i n a l at a l l , but only 
d i f f e r e n t photographs of the same p o r t r a i t . I s t i l l recognize the 
p o r t r a i t , since the d i f f e r e n t photographs are of one and the same 
p o r t r a i t and i t i s t h a t I claim t o recognize, not the photograph. 
Recognition might therefore be characterized as the perceptual 
discernment of i d e n t i t y - of the same thin g or person i n d i f f e r e n t 
circumstances (and hence on d i f f e r e n t occasions), those circumstances 
being d i f f e r e n t , perhaps, only i n the matter of time, and those 
occasions separated only by the movement of the observer, not 
necessarily by the movement or change of h i s surroundings. That 
recognition concerns i d e n t i t y and that n o t i c i n g a resemblance does not 
i s what most c r u c i a l l y distinguishes the two concepts. 
Unlike recognition, noticing a resemblance gives r i s e t o the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of sor t i n g things i n t o various kinds. This important 
difference i s easily obscured by the s i m i l a r i t i e s , f o r these 
s i m i l a r i t i e s are more f i n e l y meshed than the crude f a c t of t h e i r both 
being noticings. They are, indeed, noticings of a cert a i n kind. 
I n chapter 2 I described noticing a resemblance i n terms of 
periods of time layered one on the other. Noticing a resemblance marks 
the beginning of a period of seeing t h a t "rides" (superveniently) on 
another period of seeing that began e a r l i e r and underlies i t a l l 
through. These "layers" of seeing correspond t o d i f f e r e n t "epistemic 
le v e l s " , as I called them. I f a face, f o r example, i s seen at f i r s t 
without seeing any resemblance t o another, f o r however short a time, and 
then the resemblance i s seen, the resemblance i s noticed i n i t s own 
r i g h t , even though i t i s supervenient on seeing the face. But i f the 
s t a r t of seeing the resemblance coincides w i t h the s t a r t of seeing the 
face, then the resemblance i s not noticed i n i t s own r i g h t , but only as 
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part of notic i n g the face, i f indeed the face i n turn has been noticed 
i n i t s own righto 
Equally, i n the case of noticing, say, a pen on a desk, periods of 
seeing are layered one on another, or run side by side, and the 
beginnings of these periods do not coincide i f i t i s a no t i c i n g i n i t s 
own r i g h t ; the desk has been seen before the pen has begun t o be 
seen. However, the "layers" here do not correspond t o d i f f e r e n t 
epistemic l e v e l s , but l i e along the same epistemic plane. Hence, 
noticing the pen i s not supervenient on seeing the t a b l e , even though 
the pen i s on i t = What does l i e on a d i f f e r e n t epistemic plane i s seeing 
(or noticing) that the pen i s on the table, and t h i s i s the same kind of 
notici n g as both recognition and noticing a resemblance, i n that a l l 
three involve two epistemic levels. 
Perhaps the inclusion of recognition i n t h i s type w i l l seem 
problematic, i n view of the stated c r i t e r i o n that what i s recognized i s 
one and the same thing; how can one and the same thing l i e on two 
epistemic levels? That question merely leads us i n t o the trap of i t s own 
confusion, f o r i t should be borne i n mind that each of the two things 
involved i n noticing a resemblance also occupy the same epistemic l e v e l . 
I t i s the r e l a t i o n of resemblance that l i e s on a d i f f e r e n t one. Equally, 
T.S.Eliot obviously occupies the same epistemic l e v e l as himself. I t i s 
the r e l a t i o n of i d e n t i t y t h a t occupies a d i f f e r e n t one; and the r e l a t i o n 
of i d e n t i t y i s not a " r e l a t i o n " between a thing and i t s e l f , but between 
d i f f e r e n t sets of circumstances i n which the same thing occurs (sets of 
circumstances related by the same t h i n g ) . Questions of i d e n t i t y take 
t h i s forms "Is t h i s apple, which I f i n d i n t h i s present set of 
circumstances, the same apple as the one I found i n a c e r t a i n past set 
of circumstances?" I f I seem t o recognize the apple, then I am l i k e l y t o 
answer "yes". I f not, then my answer i s l i k e l y t o be "no". Whether or 
not I believe that I do i n f a c t recognize the apple would be influenced 
by such factors as my seeming t o remember that I ate the apple I saw 
previously. This would t e l l me that i f I do i n f a c t remember eating the 
apple then I could not possibly recognize i t now. A l l t h a t remains t o 
s e t t l e my b e l i e f i s some evidence t o show that I did i n f a c t eat the 
apple, while what s e t t l e s the t r u t h of my b e l i e f has been a l l along 
whether or not I i n f a c t recognize the apple. But the question of 
whether the apple now i s the same as i t s e l f previously i s of course 
absurd, though i t makes perfect sense t o enquire as t o how much or how 
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l i t t l e the apple has changed over a given period of time* To speak of 
the apple changing necessarily implies t h a t i t i s the same apple that 
changes; but i f you are tempted, as Hume might have been, t o suggest 
that the s l i g h t e s t change means another apple, then the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t a l k i n g about an apple changing i s denied t o you (and so, therefore, i s 
your Humean suggestion). 
The s i m i l a r i t i e s between noticing a resemblance and recognition 
are therefore s i g n i f i c a n t ; they make the differences a l l the more 
important f o r avoiding confusion between the concepts of kind and of 
i d e n t i t y , as w e l l as making these confusions a l l the more 
understandable. I s h a l l give an example of such a confusion - one met 
very frequently; suppose someone points t o a tree and asks, "can you 
i d e n t i f y t h i s tree?" What i s the appropriate answer? Provided you can 
see the tree and are capable of drawing attention t o i t yourself, your 
answer should be "yes", even i f you have no idea what kind of tree i t 
i s . Yet you know that what the questioner means t o ask i s precisely that 
- i f you can t e l l what kind of tree i t i s . Then why doesn't he say 
that? Why doesn't he ask i f you can c l a s s i f y the tree? The questioner 
might even ask i f you recognize the t r e e , when he knows i t i s extremely 
u n l i k e l y you have seen that p a r t i c u l a r tree before, either at f i r s t hand 
or i n pictures. What he means t o ask, of course, i s i f the tree s t r i k e s 
you as resembling other trees you are f a m i l i a r w i t h and whose genus you 
know the name of. I t seems, therefore, there are two uses of the word 
" i d e n t i f y " , corresponding t o two uses of the word "recognize". Unlike 
the two uses of the word "see", f o r which there i s r e a l l y no al t e r n a t i v e 
expression i n either use, the sense of " i d e n t i f y " that means "cl a s s i f y " 
i s a source of great confusion precisely because " c l a s s i f y " i s an 
alter n a t i v e (and less ambiguous) expression i n that use. 
The confusion here i s p a r t i c u l a r l y understandable when one 
considers the method one might use to teach someone how t o c l a s s i f y 
trees. One i s l i k e l y t o point t o an oak t o give an example of the kind 
of tree we c a l l "oak". A p a r t i c u l a r tree i s then i d e n t i f i e d i n the 
process of providing an example. The purpose of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s 
not, however, t o i d e n t i f y that p a r t i c u l a r tree, but to show i t as an 
example of a ce r t a i n kind and hence t o c l a s s i f y i t . The kind of 
s i t u a t i o n i n which a tre e , or some other object, might be i d e n t i f i e d f o r 
the purpose of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s , f o r example, when i t serves as a 
landmark« Then i t r e a l l y does matter that the object has been i d e n t i f i e d 
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and not merely c l a s s i f i e d ; what one i s looking f o r then i s a p a r t i c u l a r 
tree seen i n c e r t a i n circumstances previously, and not j u s t any tree of 
a certain kind. This i s precisely the kind of s i t u a t i o n i n which what 
one hopes t o do i s t o recognize something„ The difference between the 
two kinds of s i t u a t i o n i s marked by the appropriate ausserunq that 
accompanies success i n each case. When you recognize a landmark, you 
might exclaim, "There i t i s ! " But when you notice an example of a 
certain kind of thi n g you have been t r y i n g t o f i n d , you might exclaim, 
"There's one!" You have not recognized anything, but have noticed a 
resemblance between something you see now and have never seen before, 
and other things you have seen before, or have seen pictures of, but do 
not see now; t h i s t e l l s you tha t a l l these things, seen and remembered, 
are of the same kind. 
There remains one further apparent p o s s i b i l i t y , however. Might i t 
be true t o say that someone who can dis t i n g u i s h oaks can recognize oaks, 
i n the sense th a t he can distinguish one and the same type? Might a type 
take the place of a p a r t i c u l a r i n the way that a picture can take the 
place of the thin g depicted when i t comes t o recognizing a picture as 
opposed t o what i t depicts? 
The important difference that cannot be put aside i s t h a t while a 
picture i s a p a r t i c u l a r (or a "token" of the type called " p i c t u r e " ) , a 
type i s not a token of anything. But does tha t r e a l l y matter? We can and 
do count types as w e l l as tokens (e.g. numbers of d i f f e r e n t species), 
and a l l t h a t cannot be avoided i s that what i s recognized i s one and the 
same, whether i t be token or type. Then one i s able t o speak of 
i d e n t i f y i n g a type, and a l l that i s required t o amend the question "Can 
you i d e n t i f y t h i s tree?" i s t o say, "Can you i d e n t i f y t h i s tyjae of 
tree?" Could t h i s be r i g h t ? 
What I think i s being overlooked here i s that though we can count 
types, t h i s i s supervenient on the individuation of tokens - we count 
one token of each type. Enumeration cannot escape dependence on 
individuation. But l e t us ignore t h i s obstacle f o r a moment and suppose 
that types can be i d e n t i f i e d . 4 For even i f they can, another way i n 
which the question about i d e n t i f y i n g trees i s understandably confused i s 
highlighted by t h i s thought. Consider these two questionss1."Can you 
i d e n t i f y t h i s man?", when shown the man himself or a picture of him. 
2."Can you i d e n t i f y Ludwig Wittgenstein?", when shown a series of 
pictures of d i f f e r e n t men.5 i n the second question we are interested i n 
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the relationship between an individual and a name. I n the f i r s t question 
t h i s might also be the point of in t e r e s t ; the question might be answered 
by saying, "Yes, he i s Ludwig Wittgenstein,," But then again that might 
not be the point of i n t e r e s t . The questioner might instead be interested 
i n the relati o n s h i p between the individual and h i s occupation or 
something he i s famous f o r . The question might be answered by saying, 
"Yes, he i s the man who gave his inherited fortune t o h i s s i s t e r . " ; or, 
"..who said that death i s not an event i n l i f e . " ; or, "...who repudiated 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions." ...and so on. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the 
questioner might not be interested i n anything you happen t o know about 
the man, including h i s name, but only i n whether or not you have seen 
him before, and i f so where; or even j u s t whether or not you recognize 
him. But c l e a r l y there i s somehing wrong there. I f the questioner meant 
th a t , he would not ask i f you can i d e n t i f y the man, but i f you recognize 
him. Yet i s there anything less wrong w i t h asking i f you can i d e n t i f y 
someone when what i s required i s some information about him, such as h i s 
name? 
The two questions a t issue are easily confused. The f i r s t i s not a 
question about i d e n t i t y a t a l l , but about what can be a t t r i b u t e d t o 
someone already i d e n t i f i e d . I f you ask a person h i s name, you are not 
t r y i n g t o "establish h i s i d e n t i t y " , f o r even i f i d e n t i t y i s something 
that can be established of someone, tha t has already been established -
there he i s i n f r o n t of you. To say that t h i s i s what you are t r y i n g t o 
do not only assumes tha t i d e n t i t y i s a property, but makes i t seem as 
i f , without knowing h i s name, you cannot be sure of recognizing t h i s 
person on any future occasion. The second question - "Can you i d e n t i f y 
Ludwig Wittgenstein?", when shown a series of pictures of various people 
- i s a d i f f e r e n t matter. This r e a l l y i s a question about i d e n t i t y . You 
are then t r y i n g t o establish which man has that name. The question might 
be put d i f f e r e n t l y , and indeed s p l i t i n t o two questions, without 
a l t e r i n g i t s sense; a)"Would you recognize Wittgenstein i f you saw a 
picture of him?" b) "Which of these men, i f any, i s Wittgenstein?" 
Questions of i d e n t i t y therefore have a cer t a i n d i r e c t i o n of f i t 
t h at i s opposed t o the d i r e c t i o n of f i t of questions concerning 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , description ( d e f i n i t e or i n d e f i n i t e ) , or proper name. 
Questions of i d e n t i t y concern which individual f i t s a given name, 
description, or other pre-conceived c r i t e r i o n of uniqueness - the quest 
i s t o f i n d that i n d i v i d u a l . Questions of a t t r i b u t i o n , on the other hand, 
concern which description or proper name f i t s a given i n d i v i d u a l - the 
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quest i s t o f i n d "the r i g h t words". 
Now i t i s clear t h a t the question, "Can you i d e n t i f y t h i s ty_pe. of 
tree" , even i f types can be i d e n t i f i e d , i s l i k e question 1 rather than 
question 2. I t s " d i r e c t i o n of f i t " i s that of "find i n g the r i g h t words". 
I f types can be i d e n t i f i e d , then the type here has already been 
i d e n t i f i e d . But what i s r e a l l y required, of course, i s the name of the 
type - and i f types can be i d e n t i f i e d , then a common noun, such as 
"oak", w i l l now funt i o n as a proper name, l i k e "Wittgenstein". Even 
allowing t h i s obvious absurdity, the question ought t o be, "Can you name 
t h i s type of tree?" 
This p a r t i c u l a r confusion concerning d i r e c t i o n of f i t does not 
a f f e c t questions l i k e 2. But now the problem of whether or not types can 
be i d e n t i f i e d becomes c r u c i a l . I f types can be i d e n t i f i e d , then the 
question, "Which type of tree i s t h i s ? " , which otherwise belongs t o type 
1 questions, could also be a question of type 2 - i t could have either 
d i r e c t i o n of f i t . But the question, "Can you i d e n t i f y an oak?" i s most 
problematic of a l l , as i t seems t o make sense as a whole, yet makes no 
sense ei t h e r as a question about i d e n t i f y i n g a token, or as a question 
about i d e n t i f y i n g a type, even i f the l a t t e r i s possible. Somehow, i t i s 
a combination of 1- and 2- type questions, trading on both directions of 
f i t . On one l e v e l , i t gives the appearance of being a type-1 question, 
i n that i t i s a token of the type "oak" that i s t o be " i d e n t i f i e d " . But 
then i t i s not a request f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , but f o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - i t 
has the descriptive d i r e c t i o n of f i t , and the appropriate ausserung f o r 
success i s "There's one!" (the implied type that the token i s one of i s 
f i t t e d t o t h i s token). On the other hand, the name of the type has 
already been given i n the question, so i f the question i s amended t o 
"Can you c l a s s i f y an oak?", i t s t i l l seems odd - the " r i g h t words" have 
already been found. 
I n view of t h i s , the question gives the appearance, on another 
l e v e l , of being a type-2 question, l i k e "Can you i d e n t i f y the E i f f e l 
Tower?" The appropriate ausserunq f o r success then i s "There i t i s ! " , 
and i t has an i d e n t i f i c a t o r y d i r e c t i o n of f i t . But then that assumes 
types can be i d e n t i f i e d ; "an oak" needs amending t o "the oak". The 
question i s even odder now, however, since some p a r t i c u l a r oak i s going 
t o be granted the special p r i v i l e g e of being i d e n t i c a l w i t h the type of 
which i t i s a token, and i t does not matter which oak that i s . I n an act 
of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , i t always matters which thing i s picked or pointed 
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out, whereas i n an act of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i t matters which ty_pjs what i s 
picked belongs t o , and that i s what matters here. This brings us back t o 
the unavoidable conclusion that the thought that types can be i d e n t i f i e d 
involves an assumption of i d e n t i t y between a type and a token, which i s 
an error i n t e g r a l w i t h the confusion between i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ; i t i s a f a i l u r e t o distinguish epistemic levels, s i m i l a r 
t o that which a f f l i c t s empiricism with respect t o seeing. What has been 
misleading here was t o speak of naming a type; the type, rather, i s 
constituted by the meaning of the (general) name. Hence, the term "oak" 
does not function as a proper name i n r e l a t i o n t o a type, but as a 
general name i n r e l a t i o n t o tokens of that type. 
What status, then, does that leave t o the question, "Can you 
i d e n t i f y an oak?"? One seems t o know what i s intended; I would respond 
by t r y i n g t o f i n d an example of an oak, and my ausserunq on success 
would be "There's one!" Yet neither the act of exemplification nor the 
ausserunq f i t the question. When I f i n d an example, I f i t the 
description t o t h i s tree; but my quest was not t o f i n d t h i s tree i n 
pa r t i c u l a r , so I was not t r y i n g t o f i t t h i s tree t o a description or 
proper name. My act would therefore be one of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Yet the 
question "can you c l a s s i f y an oak?" does not seem t o make sense e i t h e r . 
However, I th i n k t h i s question only does not seem t o make sense 
due t o i t s s i m i l a r i t y t o the question, "Can you c l a s s i f y t h i s oak?", 
which i s as s i l l y a question as "Can you name the E i f f e l Tower?" The 
point i s th a t having the word "oak" ready t o hand does not a f f e c t the 
di r e c t i o n of f i t , and that i s why i t does not matter that i t i s already 
contained i n the question. The sense i n which a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y quest i s 
one of "fi n d i n g the r i g h t words" i s not the l i t e r a l sense i n which an 
i d e n t i f i e s t o r y quest i s one of "finding the r i g h t person/thing" ( t h i s i s 
a metaphorical sense of " f i n d " - one does not carry out an " i n t e r n a l " 
search). The words might have been "ready t o hand" a l l along, but what 
matters i s when (and where) you apply them. Hence, the answer t o the 
question, "Can you c l a s s i f y an oak?", wherein an appropriate example i s 
found t o which the descriptive term already given i n the question can be 
applied, has the same d i r e c t i o n of f i t as the answer t o the question, 
"Can you c l a s s i f y t h i s tree?", wherein the appropriate term i s applied 
t o the example already pointed t o as part of the indexical expression 
" t h i s " . The gesture i s as much a part of the l a t t e r question as the term 
"oak" i s a part of the former, but that does not make either question 
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circular. Circularity i s introduced only i f the two questions merge into 
the hybrid form, "Can you classify this oak?" (assuming no other level 
of classification i s required). 
Nevertheless, "Can you classify an oak?" s t i l l seems ill-formed, 
as does "can you identify Wittgenstein?" The reason i s t h i s ; questions, 
whether genuine requests for information or tests, might either directly 
concern the propositional content of a possible answer impersonally, or 
only concern the propositional content of a possible answer via the 
person who i s the subject of the question. A question of the former sort 
would imply that an act of classification i s required by the form, 
"Which kind of tree i s this?" or, "What i s an example of an oak?" 
Alternatively i t would imply that an act of identification i s required 
by the form, "Which of these men is Wittgenstein?" A question of the 
la t t e r sort, on the other hand, concerns the a b i l i t y of the person 
addressed second-personally to carry out such an act of classification 
or identification. Such a question is therefore really about the 
person's past experience and perceptual capacities. Hence, i t would 
imply that an act of classification i s required by the form, "Can you 
t e l l what kind of tree this is?" or, "Can you distinguish an oak?" And 
alternatively i t would imply that an act of identification i s required 
by the form, "Do you recognize Wittgenstein?" The problem with questions 
l i k e "Can you classify an oak?" or, "Can you identify Wittgenstein?", i s 
that they are hybrids of these two types of question. 
These considerations have therefore been led through a cluster of 
interrelated confusions which sometimes a f f l i c t our thoughts i n multiple 
fashion. Each of them i s made a l l the more tempting by the ease with 
which the concept of identity i s misunderstood. The identity relation i s 
a relation between sets of circumstances i n which the same thing occurs 
on different occasions. In other words, i t i s a relationship of 
contexts. The misunderstanding of this relation i n terms of something 
being the same as i t s e l f may be cause or symptom of the construal of 
identity i n terms of things having the same appearance, or being 
"indiscernible". Hence, we speak of "identical" twins, and i t becomes a 
matter of mere probability that something treated as i f i t were two 
things "the same as each other" i s really one and the same thing i f the 
"two" things are indiscernible. Then the sense of "sameness" i s not a 
substantive one i n time, but a predicative one separated by time; 
something might not have been "the same as i t s e l f " because the time that 
i s integral to existence i s treated as i f i t separated things from 
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themselves, thus creating a need for indiscernibility to bring the 
"separated" thing back "together"„ Identity then seems to become a 
matter of our means of discerning i t - recognition would then become 
identical with identity. 
Another aspect of this misunderstanding i s that the indiscernibi-
l i t y account cannot do justice to the fact that one and the same thing 
can change i n appearance and even i n substantial properties,If something 
appears discernibly different on two occasions, then ex hypothesi that 
thing i s no longer "identical with i t s e l f " . Unlike Leibniz, Hume does 
not t r y to pretend that there i s some other way of interpreting the 
indiscernibility "criterion" that might avoid this d i f f i c u l t y ; Hume i s 
more consistent i n embracing i t s absurd and ultimately self-refuting 
results. (As pointed out earlier, i f the slightest change i n an apple 
means another apple, how can i t be this apple that has changed?) 
These criticisms have obvious implications for the concept of 
recognition, and are borne out by the nature of recognition as we 
commonly experience i t . We do not need the appearance of something to be 
unchanged i n a l l respects on different occasions in order to recognize 
i t . We might recognize someone we know despite the effects of age; we 
might "see through" a disguise. Indeed i t i s not the appearance of 
something, or anything discernible about i t that must be the same i n 
order to recognize i t , but rather that which makes an appearance. The 
sameness of that which makes an appearance i s a necessary condition for 
recognition, but of course this i s a sufficient (and analytically 
t r i v i a l ) condition only for identity. Recognition requires a perceptual 
criterion i n addition. The appearance of something might have changed so 
radically that we can no longer recognize i t ; then our means of 
discerning that this i s something we have seen before i s denied us, and 
even i f somehow, perhaps through testimony, we come to know that we have 
seen this thing before on such-and-such an occasion, we have not 
recognized i t , except i n a non-perceptual sense of "recognition", as i n 
"recognizing" someone's authority (but that really means 
"acknowledgement"). 
In order to recognize something, there must be something about i t s 
appearance, however transformed, that strikes i n us a sense of 
recognition. That w i l l then give reason to ask the question, "Do I 
recognize t h i s , or have I merely noticed i t s resemblance to something 
else?" Such a thought i s only l i k e l y to cross one's mind i f the 
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appearance i s sufficiently transformed to cast doubt over the sense of 
familiarity; instead of taking i t for granted that this i s so-and-so, 
one wonders whether i t i s or not (and of course i t s t i l l might not be 
so-and-so even i f one does take i t for granted that i t i s ) . Once this 
sense of recognition has struck us, the only remaining condition for 
recognition i s that what one seems to recognize i s what one has seen 
before., 
Having outlined what I see as a misconception of identity and 
recognition, which creates many of the traditional problems of identity, 
including personal identity, the test for the alternative description I 
have offered i s to see i f i t can be developed and f i l l e d i n i n such a 
way as to dissolve these problems. Let us consider the problem of 
Hobbes's ship* In fact this example i s not as representative as Hobbes 
may have thought, since the change the ship undergoes i s due to human 
agency= Prima Facie that may seem irrelevant, but, as I shall t r y to 
show, the question of identity here i s intimately bound up with the 
specific nature of the intentionality that causes the change, and this 
intentionality i s inapplicable i n cases not involving human (or animal) 
agency. Nevertheless, as I shall also t r y to show, what i s distinctive 
about the physical manifestation of the specific nature of thi s 
intentionality i s also what decides questions of identity i n cases not 
involving human agency. 
Imagine a ferryboat that has taken passengers back and forth 
across a lake for many years, and has been affectionately named, say, 
"The Lady of the Lake". Then suppose i t i s decided not only that the 
boat requires a complete replacement of timbers, but that i t needs to be 
redesigned. I t w i l l be somewhat larger and a sli g h t l y different shape, 
to take more passengers per crossing with greater safety. When the work 
is done, "The Lady of the Lake" is painted back on the side. 
I t does not seem nonsensical to say that the name has been painted 
back on; i t does not seem nonsensical to say that this boat required a 
complete replacement of timbers and needed to be redesigned. Yet a 
l i t t l e reflection may raise some doubts. One may well be struck by the 
thought, "Of course i t i s not the same boat - another one has taken i t s 
place, and a l l that is the same is the function i t serves and the name 
given to i t . But i f this i s now another boat because i t has been 
redesigned, which of the "two" boats has been redesigned? I t is not as 
i f the blue-print for the manufacture of a number of boats has been 
redrawn to different specifications, so that the old boat w i l l be l e f t 
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to languish i n a shed somewhere, while the new boats are being b u i l t . I t 
is just one boat that has been redesigned. I f i t i s a case of an old 
boat being replaced by a new one, is i t the old boat or the new 
replacement that has been redesigned? 
Suppose a regular passenger notices the change and says to the 
skipper, "A new boat! What's happened to the old one?" The skipper might 
reply, "She's been transformed! You'd hardly recognize her, but there 
she i s . " The passenger might think, "What's the difference?" In fact 
there i s a difference, but the skipper's reply i s appropriate only i f 
the work was carried out i n a certain way; that i s , i f the work was 
carried out on the old boat, and the new timbers were not put together 
independently. The physical manifestation of the intention that informs 
the work, i n terms of which the specific nature of the intention i s 
discernable, i s distinctive. One obvious way i n which work on a 
different boat can be distinguished from work on the same boat, i s i f 
the new timbers are put together i n such a way that there are, even 
momentarily, two objects i n existence during the same period of time, 
each of which i s appropriately described as a boat; then i t i s obvious 
that a new boat i s being b u i l t , and therefore that the boat to be used 
henceforward i s not the boat used before. But what i f the old boat were 
destroyed and then work begins with the new timbers? Again, the new 
timbers are put together independently, since what is done by putting 
the new timbers together i s independent of what i s done to the old boat 
- these are two independent acts. This i s a case of the destruction and 
construction of two different boats, as opposed to the radical 
transformation of a single boat, since the act of construction is not an 
extension of the act of destruction, such that the former i s an act of 
alteration. 
But what i s physically distinctive about an act of alteration, as 
opposed to one of new creation? Or does i t , after a l l , come down purely 
to the intention of the craftsman - what he decides is the case? In the 
case of the portrait of T.S Eliot, what decided whether or not i t was a 
portrait of Eliot was the intention of the a r t i s t , but i n terms of 
reference and not just what the a r t i s t "decided". However, this i s 
analogous to what determines whether or not what i s being b u i l t or 
altered i s a boat, not to what determines whether or not i t i s the same 
boat. The two cases obviously both involve human agency, but the boat is 
analogous to the painting, not to T.S.Eliot. The intention of the a r t i s t 
determined what the painting was of, not anything about Eliot himself; 
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that the painting was of T.S Eliot was necessary for the possibility of 
recognizing him i n the painting, but nothing about T.S.Eliot depends on 
the intentionality of anyone but himself, except the language he uses 
and what i s done to him, since he is not a manufactured object. But 
since the painting, l i k e the boat, i s a manufactured object, everything 
about i t s nature as a painting depends on the intentionality of the 
a r t i s t . I f the a r t i s t radically goes over the work he has already done 
on the painting, what decides whether i t is the same painting or a new 
one therefore cannot be divorced from the nature of the a r t i s t ' s 
intentions. However, what matters is the nature of the physical 
manifestation of these intentions, not simply what the a r t i s t decides i s 
the case. 
There are two ways this physical manifestation i s required to 
distinguish an act of alteration from an act of new creation. F i r s t l y , 
so that the painting i s s t i l l of the same subject, the a r t i s t must 
continue to refer to T.S.Eliot i n the way previously described. This i s 
of course not sufficient by i t s e l f , since the a r t i s t (or indeed 
different a r t i s t s ) could paint several pictures of the same subject. 
The equivalent of this reference i n the case of the boat i s the purpose 
that the finished a r t i c l e serves ( i . e . , the use to which i t i s put) -
this i s what determines i t s "boathood", i n the way that reference 
determines "portrait-of-T.S.Eliot-hood". Again, this condition is not 
sufficient to determine that the boat i s the same boat, since many 
different boats can serve the same purpose. Furthermore, with respect to 
questions of identity, this condition applies only to manufactured 
objects, which are classified functionally; when a term i s defined 
functionally, the nature of the objects to which the term applies i s 
partly determined by that application during manufacture, including 
whether or not the object remains numerically identical during the 
process ( i . e . , the nature of a painting or a boat i s entirely determined 
by this intentionality i n so far as i t i s a painting or a boat). 
The second condition that i s required for identity i n these two 
examples, however, and which i s equally insufficient by i t s e l f i n cases 
involving human agency, i s also required i n cases not involving human 
agency, for which i t i s then sufficient by i t s e l f . This condition is 
causal continuity. A painting can only be said to have been altered i f 
the revisionary work carried out on i t has been i n a special sense 
causally continuous. The f i r s t strokes of the revisionary work must l i n k 
up with some of the original strokes; the t o t a l i t y of original strokes 
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must support the new ones (they must not, for example, have been cleaned 
off or covered over, since that would be a case of "starting again"). 
Likewise, the boat i s being altered, as opposed to newly created, only 
i f , t h e original structure of timbers support the new timbers in the 
process of replacement and change of structure. 
Only the combination of these two conditions i s sufficient to 
distinguish an act of alteration from one of new creation, i n terms of 
i t being an extension of an act of new creation. I t does not matter that 
the beginning of the physical act of alteration i s separated i n time 
from the end of the original physical act of new creation, for the 
intentional categories do not i n any case involve duration in time. 
(This point w i l l gain significance later i n connexion with personal 
identity.) But the f i r s t condition is required only because i t is acts 
that are being distinguished here; this condition i s not required where 
no agency i s involved; causal continuity then suffices. I shall now 
i l l u s t r a t e the application of the criterion of causal continuity to a 
case not involving human agency. 
What do we mean when we say this butterfly used to be a 
caterpillar? We imply that i t i s one and the same thing that has 
undergone such a radical transformation that i t satisfies entirely 
different descriptions at different stages of i t s l i f e . Must this really 
be some kind of "naive mistake" just because the caterpillar and the 
butterfly are dissimilar i n v i r t u a l l y every discernable respect, 
including the number of legs? But i f the caterpillar and the butterfly 
are two different things, which of the two has undergone the 
metamorphosis? Where is the sense in saying that the caterpillar has 
turned into the butterfly? The sense in which they are "two different 
things" i s that they are classified differently; that has no more 
bearing on whether or not i t i s the same thing, than the fact that 
people are classified differently during various stages of their lives 
("baby", "child", "adult"), has any bearing on who is being referred to. 
But then i f we are referring to one thing, what i s the higher 
classification for this one thing that i s a caterpillar and then a 
butterfly? We seem to have no equivalent of "person" in t h i s case, but 
that i s just a peculiarity of our language. What is required is is a 
more general description than "person" that applies to this case as well 
as to persons, and such a description might be something l i k e "causal 
tract". Some causal tracts are manifest as caterpillars or as 
butterflies on different occasions, and the sense in which the numerical 
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identity of the causal tract i s discernable throughout the different 
manifestations i s the sense i n which we can observe a sequence of 
causally related events - a sense of "see" that finds no place i n Hume's 
universe. 
The causal continuity that characterizes the kind of organic 
transformations that occur i n l i v i n g things i s of course internal to 
those things; the externality of the causal relations concerns the parts 
of that organic whole, not the whole in relation to other wholes, which 
i n turn constitute together a whole on a different mereological 
levelo The paths that such causal tracts actually forge i s nevertheless 
affected by other tracts. The way, for example, people affect each other 
can i t s e l f be traced as a tract on a different mereological level, i n 
which human existence i s seen as a whole - a tract we c a l l "history". 
Each of our lives i s a part of history. Equally, the causal continuity 
of every tract extends far beyond the apparent bounds of a given whole. 
A plant, animal or person flourishes or perishes according to the nature 
of what i t or he or she absorbs, or f a i l s to absorb, from the 
environment - just as the environment i s affected by what the organism 
exudes into i t and/or how i t acts on i t , which i n turn helps to 
determine what the organism continues to absorb. The boundaries of a 
given causal tract i s therefore far from clear, for certain parts of 
different tracts become parts of each other. Hence, at the highest 
mereological level, a l l these tracts are parts internal to the t o t a l i t y 
of a l l that exists. That i s made possible by the causal interaction of 
the parts. So although we lead individual lives, each of us i s a part of 
something greater; not of something with metaphysically precise 
boundaries l i k e a country, or of anything that is the result i f human 
agency (affected by that as i t may be), but of the natural world. 
Perhaps, however, this causal continuity that applies to the 
inorganic as well as to the organic, and even when to the organic, as 
much to a plant as to a person as a physical entity, w i l l not seem 
sufficient for personal identity. Indeed, but this i s more a question of 
personhood than of identity, and that i s entirely down to 
intentionality; there can be no "psychological criterion" other than 
th i s . And intentionality can never be a criterion of identity, since 
continuity i s inapplicable; i t can only be a criterion of personhood. 
The intentional categories, such as "thought", "belief", "memory", 
"imagination", are distinguished from sensational states of 
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consciousness precisely i n that they are non-continuous - they have no 
duration, but are re-created on each occasion they are called into 
question., Each time you are asked i f you believe that-p, you decide 
afresh; your decision, which alone settles what you believe, does not 
persist i n time, for no change is possible without i t being a different 
belief (and time, after a l l , i s change). Rather, your decision marks a 
boundary. 
Sensations, on the other hand, are continuous i n the sense that 
something i s going on i n a part of the body in the absence of which the 
sensation would not be f e l t . The location of what i s "going on" may or 
may not be an integral aspect of such a state of consciousness. You 
might say with some surprise, "Ah!- the pain has stopped." But you would 
not express a similar sense of surprise i f you stopped believing a 
certain proposition. Equally, you cannot decide whether you are i n pain 
or not. The pain i s marked by boundaries, which are typically expressed 
by ausserunqen, but i t does not i t s e l f mark a boundary. 
How, then, can the tract of my thoughts, beliefs, memories and 
imaginings be traced through the course of my l i f e ? There simply i s no 
such "tract". Though Derek Pa r f i t ^ does not claim his "psychological 
c r i t e r i a " are c r i t e r i a for identity, they s t i l l suffer from confusion 
between his substitute for identity - survival - and personhood, as well 
as between identity and resemblance. Psychological survival for Parfit 
i s constituted by the similarity of memories and thoughts etc., and 
though survival i s supposedly independent of the issue of identity, i t 
implies the survival of someone; the concept of identity i s b u i l t into 
the concept of survival. I f i t is the survival of memories and thoughts 
that matters, rather than of people, then those memories and thoughts 
themselves must be allowed the possibility of the very transformations 
that Parfit thinks is a problem for identity. But since these 
intentional categories do not persist i n time precisely because the 
possibility of change is denied them (only exchange i s possible), we 
cannot speak of their survival. So there is a problem about the idea of 
anything surviving i f survival is defined i n terms of psychological 
c r i t e r i a . I f I say that I "have" the same beliefs, memories etc. as 
someone else, I have assumed the possibility that they might also be 
similar; by "same", I do not mean they are in the same "place" at the 
same time, since both someone else and myself are supposed to "have" 
them at the same time. This of course i s to assume that beliefs and 
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memories are "inner" psychological "objects", which i n this case rules 
out the possibility of my beliefs and memories being numerically 
identical with someone else's at the same time. 
I f , on the other hand, I use "belief" and "memory" i n a more 
verbal sense, I should be speaking of what someone else and myself 
believes and remembers, and that, of course, could be numerically 
identical during the same period of time. I should say that I think 
differently these days, that I believe different propositions, remember 
different events, imagine different scenarios, rather than that my 
thoughts, beliefs, memories and imaginings have changed; for I do not 
treat these as i f they were things that might be identified (or 
compared), any more than I treat resemblances and types i n that way. 
For Parfit, my survivor, i f indeed i t i s I who survives, i s 
whoever "has" thoughts and memories etc. most similar to the ones I have 
"had". Equally, someone who q-remembers "my" experiences i s 
q-remembering experiences that are "identical" to "mine", i n the sense 
that there i s no "discernable" difference between the two "sets of 
experiences". The q-memory now has a verbal sense, while the experiences 
become psychological "objects". But instead of speaking of "having the 
same experiences", I should rather speak of several people experiencing 
the same event, thing, state of affairs etc. The sense of "same" then i s 
that of numerical identity, not qualitative similarity. 
I t might matter to me that what I have experienced i s remembered 
(or even experienced) by other people after my death, but that has as 
l i t t l e to do with personal survival as i t has with personal identity; i f 
identity does not matter, why should i t matter to me that "my" 
experiences are q-remembered? But i f i t matters to me that what I have 
experienced is remembered, then i t i s identity that matters to me - not 
my own, but that of what I have experienced. Parfit understandably 
seeks consolation for mortality, which of course i s a distinctively and 
historically philosophical aspiration. But Parfit's answer i n terms of 
q-memory i s not a very philosophical "solution". Compared to the 
selfless serenity and love aspired to i n Taoist nature-mysticism, for 
example, Parfit's offering satisfies and reflects only the petty 
egotism and insubstantial simulation that have become the hallmarks of 
Western Civilization. 
Notes, chapter 5. 
1.Theories and Things, chapter 1. 
2.Ibid. 
3.The possibility of recognizing someone who no longer exists is an 
interesting feature of our relationship to pictures, films and 
televised recordings. We are able to perceive past events by means of 
them, indicating an asymmetric causal relationship with the past. But 
this subject requires a whole thesis i n i t s own right, concerning time 
and causation. 
4.1 do not mean to imply that the incoherence of this supposition can be 
brushed aside as an independent issue - i t emerges i n what follows as 
integral to the confusion which at f i r s t might seem independent of i t . 
5.1 intend these two questions to serve as examples of two different 
kinds of question, to which the two "directions of f i t " subsequently 
discussed apply. 
6."Personal Identity" (1971). 
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